Is Tanzania a Success Story? A Long Term Analysis by Sebastian Edwards
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES












Many people helped me with this work. In Dar es Salaam I was fortunate to discuss a number of issues
pertaining to the Tanzanian economy with Professor Samuel Wangwe, Professor Haidari Amani, Dr.
Kipokola, Dr. Hans Hoogeveen, Mr. Rugumyamheto, Professor Joseph Semboja, Dr. Idris Rashid,
Professor Mukandala, and Dr. Brian Cooksey. I am grateful to Professor Benno Ndulu for his hospitality
and many good discussions. I thank David N. Weil for his useful and very detailed comments on an
earlier (and much longer) version of the paper. Gerry Helleiner was kind enough as to share with me
a chapter of his memoirs. I thank Jim McIntire and Paolo Zacchia from the World Bank, and Roger
Nord and Chris Papagiorgiou from the International Monetary Fund for sharing their views with me.
I thank Mike Lofchie for many illuminating conversations, throughout the years, on the evolution
of Tanzania’s political and economic systems. I am grateful to Steve O’Connell for discussing with
me his work on Tanzania, and to Anders Aslund for helping me understand the Nordic countries’ position
on development assistance in Africa. Comments by the participants at the National Bureau of Economic
Research “Africa Conference,” held in Zanzibar in August 2011, were particularly helpful. I am grateful
to Kathie Krumm for introducing me, many years ago, to the development challenges faced by the
East African countries, and for persuading me to spend some time working in Tanzania in 1992. Juan
Marcos Wlasiuk, a devoted Africanist and a great friend, provided wonderful research assistance in
Los Angeles. I also thank my students at UCLA’s Anderson Graduate School of Management for providing
helpful insights on Tanzania’s political, business and economic environment. Finally, I thank Elisa
Pepe from the National Bureau of Economic Research for her amazing support throughout this project.
The kind financial support of the NBER Africa Project is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed
KHUHLQDUHWKRVHRIWKHDXWKRUDQGGRQRWQHFHVVDULO\UHIOHFWWKHYLHZVRIWKH1DWLRQDO%XUHDXRI(FRQRPLF
5HVHDUFK
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2012 by Sebastian Edwards. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Is Tanzania a Success Story? A Long Term Analysis
Sebastian Edwards




The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical perspective on the reform process initiated in Tanzania
in 1986, and deepened in 1996. In order to do this I concentrate mostly on the period spanning from
1967, when the Arusha Declaration was adopted by the official political party the TANU, and 1996,
when a new approach towards foreign aid was implemented. I am particularly interested in investigating
how external aid affected Tanzania during the early years, and how it contributed to the demise of
the economy in the 1970s and 1980s. I also analyze the role played by foreign aid in the subsequent
(after 1996) recovery of the country. I emphasize both technical as well as political economy issues
related to imbalances, disequilibria, devaluation, black markets, adjustment, and reform. Because of
the emphasis on foreign aid and macroeconomics, I pay special attention to three important episodes
in Tanzania’s economic history: (a) the exchange rate crisis of the late 1970’s and early 1980s; (b)
the IMF Stand-by Program and the maxi-devaluation of 1986; and (c) The serious impasse between
donors and the Tanzanian authorities in the mid 1990s. At the end of the analysis I ask whether Tanzania
is, as officials from the multilateral institutions have claimed repeatedly, a “success story.”
Sebastian Edwards
UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Business
110 Westwood Plaza, Suite C508
Box 951481




I.-    Introduction 
In 1991, three decades after obtaining independence from Great Britain, Tanzania was the second 
poorest country in the world. According to the World Bank’s World Development Report, its GNP per 
capita was barely 100 US dollars; the only country with a lower income per person was Mozambique, 
with 80 US dollars per year.  
The fact that Tanzania was very poor was not in itself surprising. What was startling, however, 
was that in 1976, merely 15 years earlier, 24 countries were poorer than Tanzania. According to the 
World Bank, between 1976 and 1991 Tanzania’s nominal GNP per capita declined by 45 percent – from 
180 to 100 US dollars. When data adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) are used, the results are less 
dramatic, but still show a very impressive reduction in the standard of living: between 1976 and 1991 real 
income per capita fell by 15 percent, or almost 1 percent per year.
 The collapse of the Tanzanian economy 
between the mid 1970s and the early 1990s represents one of the most spectacular economic 
disintegrations ever experienced in a country not affected by a major war or natural disaster.
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Since 1991, however, Tanzania has gone through a major comeback. According to data from the 
Penn Tables, between 1990 and 2008 real (PPP adjusted) GDP per capita increased by 64 percent, or at a 
rapid 2.8 percent per year. In the year 2000 the country had reached its previous peak GDP per capita 
(achieved in 1976).
 2  During the last two decades there has also been a marked improvement from a 
comparative point of view: although Tanzania continues to be very poor, it is not any longer at the very 
bottom of the income per capita tables. According to the World Bank, in 2009 19 nations had a GDP per 
capita lower than Tanzania -- sixteen of which are in Africa. Moreover, the country has been able to 
weather the recent global financial crisis without suffering major setbacks. According to the IMF, GDP 
growth slowed down to 5% in 2008; it then increased to 5.5% in 2009, and to 6.2% in 2010; it is 
projected to be 6.7% in 2011. There has also been important progress in terms of social indicators. 
According to the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI), Tanzania has made significant 
improvements when compared both to Sub Saharan Africa and to the rest of the world. In 1995 
Tanzania’s composite HDI was barely 90% that of the rest of the Sub Saharan nations; by 2010, Tanzania 
had surpassed the African region, and its HDI was almost 3% above that of Sub Saharan Africa as a 
group. 
What makes Tanzania’s story fascinating is that foreign assistance has been at the center of the 
country’s economic failures and successes. After independence in 1961, the country became one of the 
“darlings” of the international aid community; between 1962 and 1983 Tanzania was one of the highest 
recipients of foreign aid in the world.
3 A high proportion of this aid was bilateral and came from the 
European nations – especially from the Nordic countries. The multilateral institutions, and in particular 
the World Bank, also contributed significant volumes of funds to the country’s early development effort.  
Massive foreign aid was largely used to finance President Julius African Socialism vision. In 















political manifesto presented by Nyerere to the official party (the TANU) in February, 1967.
4 By 1973 net 
official development assistance per capita (ODA) to Tanzania was already 18% higher than net foreign 
aid received, on average, by Sub Saharan African (SSA) countries.  By 1975 net per capita ODA to 
Tanzania had surpassed the SSA average by 75%, and by 1981 it was almost twice as much as the 
average for SSA.
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Nyerere’s socialist policies, however, did not work. The collectivization of agriculture backfired, 
the villagization process that forced peasants to move to villages designed by planners was strongly 
resisted by the population, the parastatal sector became a huge financial burden and a source of 
corruption, and grandiose industrial projects became mired in inefficiencies. Worse yet, in the mid 1970s 
significant shortages of all sort of goods developed, and black market activities became rampant.
6 The 
collapse of the Tanzanian economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s happened in spite of the 
involvement of donor countries – in fact, it is possible to argue that this disintegration happened because 
aid agencies were heavily involved in supporting (and even helping design) Nyerere’s ujamaa Socialism 
economic policies. In many ways, the Tanzanian experience between 1968 and the mid 1980s provides a 
stark example of the excesses of foreign assistance. During that period the international aid community 
supported the wrong policies – including the taxation of peasants and agriculture --, encouraged 
corruption, and generated economic dependency. Indeed it may be argued that Tanzania provides the 
typical case of “deadly aid” described by critics such as W. Easterly (Easterly, 2007), and D. Moyo 
(Moyo, 2009). 
However, the story of the relationship between Tanzania and the aid community is much more 
complex than what it appears at first. Indeed, there were many excesses until the mid 1980s, and many 
wasteful projects were financed with aid monies. Worse yet, a questionable development strategy was 
encouraged, and policies that reduced the wellbeing of millions of people were supported. However, in 
the early 1980s the same donor community that had financed Nyerere’s experiments, demanded 
significant policy rectification. Already in 1979, immediately after the war with Uganda and the collapse 
of the East African Community, the IMF requested major changes in economic policy. These included 
significant fiscal adjustment, a reduction in parastatals’ deficits, and a major devaluation of the Tanzanian 
shilling. The government, however, resisted these recommendations, arguing that they would work 
against the nation’s overall socialist strategy. In the years that followed the crisis deepened and social 
conditions worsened significantly.  
Starting in 1982, and as a way to induce adjustment and policy changes, the international 
community began to curtail foreign aid flows. In the four years between 1981 and 1985, net official 
assistance, in per capita terms, declined by a remarkable 40%.  
In 1986, and after President Nyerere decided not to run for reelection, the government of 
Tanzania and the IMF reached an agreement, and a Stand-by Program was put into place. The Shilling 
was devalued by 57%, and fiscal adjustment policies were undertaken.
7 In the years that followed, and 
with the assistance of the World Bank and other donor agencies a process of reform aimed at dismantling 












launched. Starting in 1986, and as a way to reward the change in policies, net aid once again increased. In 
1988, and in per capita terms, it was 92% higher than in 1985.  
The reforms were gradual, and at times they stalled; some of them even backtracked. Slowly, and 
after significant strife within the government, the reform agenda gained some momentum and the 
economy began to recover: fiscal imbalances were reduced, the external sector was liberalized, foreign 
direct investment was welcomed, the exchange rate was unified, the black market for foreign currency 
was reduced in size and eventually eliminated, and a series of social programs aimed at assisting the poor 
and reducing poverty were put in place.  
Throughout this period the international community continued to use development assistance as a 
tool to induce change and guide policy. When the reforms stalled, the donors would withhold aid flows. A 
particularly serious impasse between the government and the aid community erupted in 1993-94, and was 
only solved in 1995 when a high level committee chaired by Gerry Helleiner – a University of Toronto 
professor, and a Tanzania old hand – mediated between the parties and devised a new approach to 
coordinate aid. At the time of this writing (late 2011) the relationship between the international 
community and the government is constructive, and is largely based on credibility and trust. So much so, 
that an increasing fraction of assistance is provided as general budget support, as opposed to project 
financing. 
During the last few years Tanzania has become an often-discussed example of “African 
successes”.
8 Officials in the multilateral organizations – the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)–, and in bilateral aid agencies repeatedly refer to Tanzania’s performance as a sign that, if 
properly provided, foreign assistance can be extremely useful and can help a country grow rapidly while 
reducing poverty. In advertising Tanzania’s “success” they mention its rapid rate of growth, the 
improvement in social conditions as reflected in the Human Development Index, low inflation, and 
macroeconomic stability. There are, however, a number of skeptics, mostly from nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). They argue that growth is overestimated, that corruption is generalized, that the 
government is authoritarian, and that poverty has not declined sufficiently.   
A serious shortcoming of much of the current discussion on Tanzania’s reforms and economic 
performance is that it lacks a historical perspective. Most recent studies by economists don’t provide an 
appropriate background for understanding economic policy, the relation between the government and the 
aid community (both multilateral and bilateral), and the prospects of growth. Indeed, the years of Nyerere 
and African Socialism are mentioned on passing, but are not analyzed in details; there is no inkling on 
how devastating that period was for the population, or on the ferocious political battles that were waged in 
the years leading to the reforms.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical perspective on the reform process initiated in 
1986 and deepened in 1996. In order to do this I concentrate mostly on the period spanning from 1967, 
when the Arusha Declaration was adopted by the official political party the TANU, and 1996, when a 
new approach towards foreign aid was implemented. I am particularly interested in investigating how 
external aid affected Tanzania during the early years, and how it contributed to the demise of the 
economy in the 1970s and 1980s. In doing this I emphasize both technical as well as political economy 
issues related to imbalances, disequilibria, devaluation, black markets, adjustment, and reform. Although I 
touch on many issues, I do not attempt to provide an exhaustive account of every aspect of the country’s 
economic and political developments. Such an effort is beyond the scope of a single paper, even if it is a 
long one. In discussing these issues I focus on macroeconomic policies and overall economic 
performance. Because of its emphasis on foreign aid and macroeconomics, the paper pays especial 




late 1970’s and early 1980s; (b) the IMF Stand-by Program and the maxi-devaluation of 1986; and (c) 
The serious impasse between donors and the Tanzanian authorities in the mid 1990s. My analysis of the 
peculiarities of the reform process after 1996 is brief and somewhat sketchy. This is deliberate, since there 
are a number of recent works that cover this period. However, I do provide an evaluation – from a 
historical perspective – of these reforms.  
Before proceeding, a word on methodology: In order to deal with the issues at hand from a 
historical perspective I follow the methodology of analytical narratives, an approach that I have used in 
my previous work and that I believe is best suited for addressing the intricacies of a complex and long 
saga that has gone from hope and enthusiasm in the 1960s, to collapse in the late 1970s and 1980s, and 
back to hope stating in the late 1990s.
9 Although this is not a paper on the politics of Tanzania – there are 
many books on the subject, and some of them are very good --, I do emphasize, time and again, political 
economy angles.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II I deal with the current (that is 2011-
2012) “official” narrative regarding Tanzania’s reforms and economic performance. This “narrative” talks 
about a major success, and has its origins in the multilaterals institutions; not surprisingly, it has been 
enthusiastically embraced by the Tanzanian authorities. In Section III I put things in historical context by 
discussing the main views on economic development that dominated thinking in the 1950s and 1960s. I 
then provide an analysis on the evolution of foreign aid since independence. Section IV covers the period 
1961 (when the country became independent) through 1980. The Section opens with the expulsion of the 
IMF mission from Tanzania in November, 1979. In Section V I analyze the events that eventually led to 
the acceptance of an IMF program, and to the maxi devaluation of 1986. Section VI concentrates on the 
“war of ideas” and the role of academic and technocrats in forging the reforms. In Section VII I focus on 
the first years after the maxi devaluation of 1986, and on the first round of reforms. Here I document the 
extent of policy changes and I investigate the causes behind the slow progress in the reform process. I 
argue that this had largely to do with the fact that _- as has historically been the case in many reform 
episodes – reform opponents were able to regroup, and regain a foothold in the power structure. In 
Section VIII I (very briefly) provide some information on the second round of reforms. This is a 
deliberately short Section and is included here for the sake of completeness; as noted, the main objective 
of the paper is to provide a detailed analysis of the historical background to these reforms. In the final 
Section (Section IX) I briefly deal with the reforms since 1996, and I ask whether recent economic 
performance has indeed been as good as the multilateral institutions, and the official data for that matter, 
have suggested. 
 
II.  Tanzania’s market-oriented reforms and economic performance: The “official   story” 
There are a number of works on the evolution of the Tanzanian economy during the last 15 to 20 
years. The most comprehensive of these are (Mans, 1994), (Mutalemwa, et al., 2002), (Utz, 2008), 
(Mwase, et al., 2008), (Nord, et al., 2009), and (Robinson, et al., 2011). Many (but not all) of these wide-
ranging analyses have been undertaken by economists at the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). All 
of these studies tell, with some variations, story that emphasizes the role played by the market-oriented 
reforms in the country’s economic takeoff the mid 1990s. In many ways these analyses have contributed 
to the creation of a generally accepted or “official story” about Tanzania’s recent economic 







The most salient components of this consensus or “official” view may be described as follows:
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  Since the mid 1990s Tanzania has experienced high economic growth. Some authors – most 
notably (Robinson, et al., 2011) – date the country’s takeoff around 1996.  
  From a comparative perspective, and since 1996, Tanzania has done much better, in terms of 
economic growth and macroeconomic stability, than the average Sub Saharan country.   
  Growth has been accompanied by increased macroeconomic stability, including a major 
reduction of inflation, which in 1984 was a high 36.1%, and averaged only 8% between 2005 
and 2010. See Table 1. 
  This acceleration of growth has been attributed to the market-oriented economic reforms 
undertaken since the mid 1980s. According to (Robinson, et al., 2011 p. 22): “[The] key 
factors behind the takeoff in growth include the significant structural changes that occurred as 
the basic institutions of a market economy were introduced.” 
  The reforms came in two waves (See (Nord, et al., 2009), (Robinson, et al., 2011)): 
 
o  Phase 1: Between 1986 and 1995 the country went through a process partial 
liberalization and reforms. Major distortions were addressed, an effort was made to 
reduce the black market for foreign exchange, and imports of some goods were 
allowed as long as buyers used their “own funds.”  This initial phase of the reform 
effort stalled around 1992-93, when a major spat developed between the aid agencies 
and the government.  
o  Phase 2: Since 1996 (and until the present time) deeper reforms have been put in 
place, and a serious effort at stabilizing the economy has been made. The reform 
effort took off after an agreement was reached between the aid community and the 
government – the seeds for the agreement were detailed in the so called Helleiner 
Report. Starting in 1996 the economy was open further, the civil service was 
reformed, rules on FDI were relaxed and streamlined, privatization was implemented, 
banking reform was put in place, and massive programs aimed at improving 
education and health services were implemented ( (Nord, et al., 2009), (Robinson, et 
al., 2011), (Edwards, 2011)). 
 
  Although the reforms have been gradual, in most areas they have been deeper than in the rest 
of the Sub Saharan countries. This has been documented by (Robinson, et al., 2011), and is 
captured by “policy indexes,” such as those put together by the Fraser Institute and other 
think tanks.   
  In Tanzania the reforms impacted economic performance with a considerable lag; while the 
reforms were initiated in 1986 – albeit mildly and in a go-stop-backtrack-go fashion –, the 
inflection point in economic performance did not occur until a decade later, in 1996. 
  Macroeconomic stability, including the reduction of very large fiscal imbalances, has played 
an important role in the positive performance of the Tanzanian economy. By avoiding 
outbursts of inflation, the private sector has been able to concentrate on expanding output and 
improving efficiency.  
  A very high fraction of government expenditures has been financed by foreign aid. Official 
assistance was 12.1% of GDP in fiscal year 2008/09 (total foreign aid – including private aid 





taken the form of “government budget support,” as opposed to “program support.” Between 
1996/97 and 2008/09 “government budget support” more than doubled as a fraction of GDP, 
from 2.5% to 6%. 
  Although financial reforms have been deep, there are still a number of distortions that 
constrain the economy. In particular, the banking sector continues to be dominated by a small 
number of banks, and credit to the agricultural sector (the most important sector in the 
economy) continues to be relatively scarce. 
  Until recently, exports have played a (very) minor role in growth. In the last few years, 
however, investment in the mineral sector – most notably in gold mining – has increased 
significantly. Much of this investment has been from multinational companies. The boom in 
commodity (and especially metal) prices has also contributed to this surge in investment. 
There has also been increased foreign investment in the tourism sector. Foreign direct 
investment has reached 3% of GDP in recent years. Recent legal reforms– and, in particular, 
the Mining Act of 2010 – are expected to further bolster investment in the sector. 
  From a sectoral point of view, the agricultural sector has lagged behind throughout the “high 
growth” period. This is a worrisome development in a country where more than 74% of the 
population lives in the rural area.  
  In terms of sources of growth, most authors have estimated that since 1996 total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth has been the most important driver of economic expansion. 
According to (Nord, et al., 2009), during 1996-2000 TFP growth contributed 2.3 percentage 
points to growth; according to these authors during 2001-2008 TFP’s contribution to growth 
had climbed to 3.5 percentage points. Mwase et al.
 (Mwase, et al., 2008) used the Collins-
Bosworth model to estimate TFP growth for Tanzania and Sub Saharan Africa for the period 
1960-1997.  Their results largely correspond to those in (Nord, et al., 2009) and (Robinson, et 
al., 2011).
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  During the last few years there has been a marked improvement in tax collection. As a 
percentage of GDP tax revenues have increased from less than 10% in the early 2000s to 16% 
in 2009/10. In spite of this improvement, there is still a large gap between government 
revenues and expenditures. As noted earlier, this gap is financed through foreign aid.  
  The improved fiscal situation has allowed the government of Tanzania – as well as those of 
other SSA countries – to run countercyclical fiscal policy.   
  What I have called the “official story” emphasized the improvements in social conditions. For 
example in 1995 life expectancy at birth was slightly lower in Tanzania than in SSA; by 
2010, however, life expectancy at birth was 2.5 years higher in Tanzania. The results are 
similar when other HID indicators are considered. The government has emphasized the 
provision of social services through the MKUKUTA programs (I and II), which have 
obtained approximately 70% of budget allocations.  
  In spite of the government’s efforts, in some areas progress has been slow – this has been 
particularly the case in rural education. It is estimated that by 2015 one half of the 
Millennium Goals will be achieved (See Table 2). In many ways this situation may be 
characterized as the glass being half full. 
 
To summarize, the “official” story of Tanzania’s recent developments is one of “success.” To be 
sure, every one of the authors cited above recognizes that the country continues to be very poor, and that 
it faces major challenges if it is to maintain the growth momentum. These challenges are, largely, of the 




world, for that matter. They include issues related to: (a) capital (physical and human) accumulation; (b) 
deepening the extent of competition; (c) improving infrastructure and the quality of education; (d) 
streamlining regulation; (e) encouraging entrepreneurship; (f) strengthening institutions; and (g) 
improving governance. In terms of sectors, Tanzania’s main economic challenges are related to 
improving productivity in the agriculture, improving the provision of public services, and avoiding the 
overvaluation of the currency.  
The fact that there is some type of agreement on how to interpret the country’s recent history – 
what I have called the “official story”-- is not, on its own, a bad thing. Quite on the contrary, it shows that 
there is clarity in the facts and their interpretation. The problem, as noted, is that many of these accounts – 
and, in particular the most recent ones –provide a very limited historical background. Indeed, after going 
through these works some readers may conclude that before the reforms launched in the mid 1980s 
Tanzania was just another Third World country with poor to mediocre performance. This, of course, is 
not the case. As pointed out in the introduction –and, to be fair, in many earlier works on Tanzania’s 
development -- the decade that preceded the reforms was, to put it mildly, a disaster. Worse yet, this 
disaster was the consequence of misguided policies that were often encouraged by foreign donors. In that 
regard, it is not possible to understand Tanzania’s recent growth takeoff without some detailed reference 
to the policies that followed the Arusha Declaration of 1967.  That is, it is important to put statements 
such as “Tanzania has emerged as one of the most rapidly growing economies in South Saharan Africa,” 
in context, and to explicitly address the calamitous collapse of the Tanzanian economy during Nyerere’s 
long rule.  
A second limitation of the “official” narrative is that very few studies penned at the international 
financial institutions address the issue of the quality of data. In fact, most of the accounts discussed above 
proceed as if the official figures are fully reliable and shouldn’t be questioned or contested. The reality, 
however, is different, and as I have argued in (Edwards, 2011), there are a number of indicators that 
suggest that official figures should be interpreted with care.  
Third, many recent studies of Tanzania’s economic performance don’t deal in sufficient detail 
with the role of foreign aid in the country’s economic history. Of course, every one of them focuses on 
the importance of external assistance to close the budget gap and to finance investment and social 
programs. What recent studies have failed to do, however, is to deal with the donors’ role in the 
economy’s collapse in the mid 1970s and first half of the 1980s, and with the role it has played in 
supporting the recovery since 1986.
13 In some ways this is surprising: after all, debates on the role of aid 
in economic development in general, and in Africa in particular, continue to be very central. Indeed it 
may be argued that Tanzania provides the typical case of “deadly aid” described by critics such as W. 
Easterly (Easterly, 2007) and D. Moyo (Moyo, 2009).  
 
III.-  Ideas and the evolution of foreign aid to Tanzania  
In order to comprehend fully the evolution of Tanzania’s economic policies since independence 
in 1961, it is necessary to place them in the proper historical context. In particular, it is important to 
understand that during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s there were competing views on economic 
development. On the one hand, a large group of economists didn’t trust markets, believed that in poor 
countries planning had to guide resource allocation, and that protectionist policies provided the most 
effective way of encouraging industrialization. Most economists that supported this “planning 






representatives of this view included Ragnar Nurske, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, and Albert Hirschman. On 
the other hand, a smaller group of thinkers, including Hungarian-born Peter Bauer and T.W. Schultz from 
the University of Chicago, believed that market forces and competition provided the best institutional 
arrangement for developing countries, and that openness and export growth were essential for achieving 
rapid and sustained growth. While the “planning approach” emphasized the role of capital accumulation 
as the main source of growth, the “market approach” focused on productivity improvements and human 
capital.
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Many of Africa’s independence leaders were educated in the United Kingdom, and were highly 
influenced by Fabian Socialist ideas. Julius Nyerere attended the University of Edinburgh, Jomo Kenyatta 
and Seewoosagur Ramgoolam went to University College and the London School of Economics, and 
Kwame Nkrumah was enrolled in the London School of Economics. All of them, and to different degrees, 
believed in the “planning approach” and, when in power, followed its policies. However, not all Fabian 
socialists in Africa were exactly alike; in each country different policies were implemented at different 
times. In Kenya and Zambia, for example, planning was light, and, at least until the late 1970s, market 
signals were allowed to operate in most sectors. At the same time, and as Mwase et al. (Mwase, et al., 
2008) have pointed out, these countries aggressively pushed nationalistic and indigenization policies, 
where most businesses had to be owned by Africans. In contrast, Tanzania, Mozambique and Ethiopia, 
followed, from early on, a more intense form of planning, where markets were repressed significantly and 
the state played a growing role in the productive, investment and distribution spheres. In these countries 
most large firms, banks and insurance companies were nationalized. In Tanzania this approach reached its 
zenith during the villagization process, when more that 12 million peasants were forced to abandon their 
shambas and move into planned villages.
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At the core of the planning view of development was the idea that the accumulation of physical 
capital was the main source of economic growth, and that the availability of labor was not a constraint to 
economic expansion. These believes were based on two theoretical frameworks that had become popular 
in the 1950s: the Harrod-Domar model that emphasized the roles of the capital-output ratio and the 
savings rate in determining long term growth, and Arthur W. Lewis (Lewis, 1954) unlimited supplies of 
labor model that assumed that enormous quantities of labor were available at very low (almost zero) 
wages. A corollary of these believes was that policies aimed at raising aggregate savings and investment 
ratios were fundamental components of any successful development strategy. In countries where domestic 
savings were very low, these would be supplemented by foreign savings in the form of foreign aid. At the 
same time the government would make efforts to generate (or “mobilize”) additional resources to finance 
capital accumulation. These resources, in turn, would come from “surplus” generated by the primary 
sectors – that is, agricultural, timber, and mining. 
During the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s the “planning approach” was ahead in this “war 
of ideas.” Things, however, began to change in the late 1970s, as more developing countries in Africa, 
Latin America and parts of Asia experienced (very) low growth and deteriorating social conditions. The 
“war of ideas” reached an inflection point in the early 1980s when a growing number of academics used 
data-based analyses to question the dominant planning paradigm. In Africa the early signs that views on 
development strategies were changing came with the release of the “Berg Report” by the World Bank and 
the publication of Robert Bates book Markets and States in Tropical Africa in 1981. In Latin America the 
inflection point came with the Mexican crisis of 1982 and the realization that every country in the region 








in particular the elections of Ronald Reagan in the U.S. and Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. also affected 
the thinking about development.  
The shifting views on economic development also affected donors’ perspectives on foreign 
assistance. In a number of advanced countries these changes took time to gel, as many aid agencies were 
dominated by individuals that were inclined towards the “planning approach,” and believed that some 
form of socialism was the best way for poor countries to defeat poverty. Slowly, however, (almost) every 
Western donor changed the way in which it dealt with recipient countries. This was particularly so in Sub 
Saharan Africa, where starting in the early 1980s aid was, first reduced and then conditioned on certain 
policies and reforms being undertaken.   
In Figure 1 I present data on the evolution of net official development assistance (ODA) per 
capita to Tanzania between 1960 and 2008. Figure 2, on the other hand, includes data on the evolution of 
aid to five countries – Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda – during the same period, measured 
as a percentage of total net ODA to Sub Saharan Africa. Taken together these two figures provide a 
wealth of information: (a) They show that Tanzania has been, overall, the biggest recipient of assistance 
in the region. Indeed, starting in 1973, and with the sole exception of two years (1989 and 1990), 
Tanzania received the highest percentage of aid of any Sub Sahara African country. (b) These figures also 
show that ODA per capita to Tanzania, measured in constant 2007 US dollars, has fluctuated significantly 
during this period. It was at a minimum in 1968 (at USD 18.8) and reached a maximum in 1980, at almost 
USD 90 per capita. (c) Further, these data show that it is possible to distinguish six phases in the 
evolution of assistance during this period (As I will argue below, there is a complex and two-way 
relationship between the volume of aid and economic policies): 
 
o  Phase I, 1961-1967: From independence to the Arusha Declaration. During this first 
period there was a substantial decline in per capita assistance from almost USD 44 
per capita during the year prior to independence, to less than USD 20 per person. 
o  Phase II, 1968-1980: This period goes from the adoption of the Arusha Declaration 
to the major impasse with the IMF in late 1979. During these years foreign assistance 
increased at a vertiginous pace; it more than quadrupled in per capita terms. This was 
the result of the aid community falling in love with Nyerere’s program. The 
abundance of funds allowed the government to push forward with the policies of 
African Socialism. As I argue below, it is surprising that, even in light of obvious 
problems with these policies, aid continued to pour in until so late in time.  
o  Phase III, 1981-1985. During these years there was a precipitous decline in foreign 
assistance. These were the years of heightened confrontation with the IMF. Towards 
the latter part of this phase bilateral donors, and in particular the Nordic countries, 
also withdrew their assistance in light of the government’s unwillingness to change 
its policies. In 1984 official net aid per capita stood at USD 61, down from USD 90 
in 1980. 
o  Phase IV, 1986-1991: During this period the flow of aid remained approximately 
constant (although it did exhibit some ups and downs). These are the first years of the 
Mwinyi administration, and correspond to the initial years of the (until then elusive) 
IMF agreement. During these years the initial round of reforms was undertaken. 
o   Phase V, 1991-1995: This period corresponds to the final years of the Mwinyi 
administration, and was characterized by a stalling of the reform process and a major 
impasse between the donor community and the government. Per capita net ODA 
declined by one half during this conflictive time. 
o  Phase VI, 1996-to date: This phase marks the reviving of aid after the Helleiner 
Commission patched the relations between the government and the donor 11 
 
community. The beginning of this expansive phase corresponds to the change of 
administration from president Mwinyi to President Benjamin Mkapa, and to the 
deepening of the reform process. It also includes the first term of President Jakaya 
Kikwete.   
 
This classification of financial assistance into six distinct phases is somewhat different from what 
other authors have considered. For somewhat alternative views see (Bigsten, et al., 1999), (Wangwe, 
2002), (Harrison, et al., 2009), (Holtom, 2005), (Wangwe, 2010).  
Bilateral donors have been particularly important in Tanzania. See Table 3 for some detailed data 
on ODA by donor country. A. Bigsten et al. (Bigsten, et al., 1999), S. Wangwe (Wangwe, 2002), and 
others have pointed out that, at times, bilateral aid surpassed 80% of total aid.
16 Over the years 
approximately 50 bilateral sources have provided assistance to Tanzania. The most important have been 
the Nordic countries with roughly 30% of all assistance, on average. Sweden has provided about half of 
this amount. Germany and the Netherlands have contributed almost 23% of total aid over the past three 
decades. In terms of modality, starting in the late 1960s and until 1985 or so, much of the assistance was 
for financing very large investment projects – many of them white elephant industrial projects. Since 
1997, however, an increasing proportion of assistance has been related to programs, including reform and 
social programs.
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The information presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2, and in Table 3 is useful for putting the 
analysis of the next three sections in historical context. In particular, it helps understand the fact that 
initially aid mostly responded to policy; after 1986, however, policy responded to aid. In the rest of the 
paper I will delve in greater detail on the two-way relationship between policies and foreign aid. 
 
IV.  African Socialism, the Arusha Declaration, foreign aid, and the crisis of 1979 
On November 29
th, 1979 President Julius Nyerere met with the IMF Mission in his Msasani 
residence, overseeing the Indian Ocean. Bo Karlstrom, an affable Swede economist who led the Fund’s 
team explained to Nyerere that his institution was prepared to provide substantial assistance to Tanzania. 
These funds, he said, would help the economy recover from the war with Uganda and from the effects of 
the recent drought. He added that an IMF program would result in the release of additional funds by the 
international aid community, including by the World Bank. However, Karlstrom added, before the 
agreement could be finalized the Government of Tanzania had to make a commitment to undertake two 
important measures. First, it had to strengthen management practices in the parastatal sector, including, in 
particular, in the National Milling Corporation. Second, and most important, there was a need to deal with 
the large “overvaluation” of the Tanzanian Shilling. This, Karlstrom said, was creating all sorts of 
problems: exports were discouraged, smuggling was rampant, a black market for foreign exchange (and 
goods) had developed, and price signals were highly distorted.
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The Swede then explained that according to the Fund’s calculations the Shilling had to be 
devalued from its “effective” parity of 8.24 Tshs to the US dollar to 12.50 Tshs per USD. He added that 
the adjustment did not have to take place at once. In fact, he had preliminarily agreed with Minister of 







Minister Mtei, who was at the meeting, remembers that as Karlstrom spoke the President became 
increasingly agitated. When the economist was done Nyerere thanked him and said that he would 
certainly welcome an improvement in the parastatals management style. He then stood up, and left the 
room without commenting on the proposed devaluation of the Shilling.
19 
In his memoirs Mtei says that the president went for a walk on the beach. When the minister 
caught up with him, he noticed that Nyerere was furious. He told Mtei that “he would never allow his 
country to be run from Washington.” He added: “I will devalue the Shilling over my dead body.” After a 
few seconds he said that the IMF Mission was not welcomed in Tanzania any longer, and that the team 
had to leave the country immediately.
20 Three days after the IMF Mission was asked to depart, President 
Nyerere dismissed Edwin Mtei from the cabinet.
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The years that followed were years of crisis and sorrow: the government continued to push the 
policies of African Socialism, while shortages became generalized, mismanagement and corruption took 
over the parastatal sector, the black market became widespread, businessmen were treated as criminals or 
“economic saboteurs,” and real incomes declined precipitously. As time passed, economic conditions 
worsened, and imbalances became more pronounced. Attempts by the international community to 
convince the government to change course and address some of the most egregious disequilibria were not 
heeded. The extent of the ensuing crisis is starkly illustrated by the evolution of the black market 
premium for foreign exchange, which in October of 1982 reached the remarkable level of 368% (See 
Figure 3).  
In this Section I discuss Tanzania’s economic crisis of 1986 from a historical perspective. I begin 
by providing a brief background on economic conditions and developments during the early years of 
independence, 1961-1967. I then deal with the Arusha Declaration and the policies and consequences of 
African Socialism. Here I discuss the role played by foreign aid in supporting Nyerere’s policies.  
IV.1  Background: The Pre-Arusha Declaration period 
After Ghana’s independence in 1957, the Colonial Office developed a plan for granting self-rule 
to British colonies in Africa. Within this framework it was decided that Tanganyika would become self-
governed very late in the process. The alleged reason was that Tanganyika did not have the “civil 
servants, legislators and economic capacity to run its affairs.”
22  Sir Richard Turnbull, then governor, 
argued in 1959 that it would take about twenty years for the country to have a “sufficient number of 
Africans of experience, ability and integrity to fill posts in the public service, and in commerce and 
industry” (quoted by (Iliffe, 2005 p. 189)).  
Things, however, did not work out in the way the British had planned, and Tanganyika was the 
first East African country to become independent, on December 9
th, 1961. This rapid achievement of self-
rule was the result of unexpected political dynamics, where an innovative voting scheme that granted 
every eligible voter three votes, was used to its advantage by Julius Nyerere’s TANU.
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At independence Tanganyika was a very poor agricultural economy. In 1961, for example, the 
category “agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing” represented, at least, 40% of monetary GDP, and in 











24 In terms of employment, the agricultural sector was even more important, with an 
estimated 80% of total jobs.  
One of the early economic challenges of the new independent government was replacing the 
colonial administration by African civil servants. This process of “Africanization” was particularly 
difficult given the limited number of Tanganyikans with college degrees. From today’s perspective it is 
difficult to grasp fully the depth of this skills shortage. According to former Governor of the Bank of 
Tanzania Edwin Mtei, in the late 1950s, “… there were only ten Government secondary schools in the 
whole of Tanganyika. Tanganyikans that had gone to university and obtained degrees could be counted 
with on your finger nails: they were not more than ten, and we knew them all.”
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In May 1964 President Nyerere presented to parliament the first Five-Year Plan for Economic 
and Social Development. In the president’s own words, the purpose of this plan was “the creation – 
through African Socialism – of a country in which we can live proudly as brothers.” The First Five-Year 
Plan covered only Tanganyika, as the union with Zanzibar that formed what we know today as Tanzania 
was only announced in late April 1964, when work on the plan was almost completed. Moreover, 
unification was negotiated in secret by presidents Nyerere and Karume during the first few weeks of 
April, only four months after the Zanzibar Revolution.
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The First Five-Year Plan called for a rate of growth on national income of 6.7% per year, and a 
reduction in the subsistence sector. It also presented a protectionism-based strategy for increasing the 
degree of industrialization. As Nyerere himself put it, “[i]n future a system of industrial licensing and 
import quotas [will be implemented].”
27 
Although the first Five-Year Plan covered only the period 1964-1969, it took a long term 
perspective, and presented three main goals to be achieved by 1980: 
“(1)  to raise our per capita income from the present £ 19 6s. to £ 45; 
  (2)  to be fully self-sufficient in manpower requirements; 
  (3)  to raise the expectation of life from the present 35 to 40 years to an expectation of 50 
years.” 
 
Table 4 presents data on some important economic indicators for the period 1961-1968. Three 
points deserve attention. First, during this early period, data are only available for a handful of variables. 
Second, many of these figures, including the numbers for population growth, are, at best, broad estimates. 
Third, the figures on GDP growth are particularly questionable, as a large proportion of the economy 
(about one third) was not integrated into the monetary circuit, and took place in remote rural areas; this 
was the so-called “subsistence sector.”  
The data in Table 4 also show that until 1966 inflation was rather low, and didn’t contribute to 
real exchange rate appreciation. This is partially explained by the fact that until 1967, when the Bank of 
Tanzania was created, the country did not have an independent monetary policy. Tanzania was a member 
of the East African Currency Board, which administered the East African Shilling. The other members of 











its existence this currency board followed strict rules, and only created liquidity if this was backed by 
foreign currency reserves – mostly Sterling.
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By 1966 it became clear that the First Five-Year Plan goals’ were not to be achieved. In 
particular, some of the ambitious agricultural targets – especially those for major increases in the 
production of sisal, groundnuts and cotton – were missed by significant margins.
29 In addition, very little 
private sector investment was attracted. This was a hard blow for the authorities, since the first Plan 
explicitly assumed that almost one half of total investment would be provided by the private sector. 
Moreover, and as was shown in Figure 1, during those years per capita net overseas assistance 
experienced an important decline. It is not an overstatement to say that during 1965-66 President Nyerere 
was becoming increasingly frustrated with the country’s economic performance and future.
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IV.2 The Arusha Declaration and the economic consequences of African Socialism  
According to the legend, President Nyerere drafted the Arusha Declaration, the document that 
was to guide the country’s life for at least the next two decades, with little help from senior advisors. The 
Declaration was presented to the National Executive Commission (NEC) of the official political party 
TANU on February 3
rd, 1967, and was approved without much discussion.
31 Nyerere promulgated it 
officially on February 5
th, during the closing ceremony of the NEC meeting.  
Whether Nyerere was the sole author of the Declaration is still a subject of debate. According to 
Edwin Mtei, who met with the President around that time, Nyerere finished drafting the Declaration on 
February 3rd. An interesting question is what prompted him to pen this document and to urge TANU to 
approve it precisely at that time. Some possible explanations include the poor performance of the 
economy – and in particular of private investment –, relative to the goals set in the First Five-Year Plan. 
Another possible reason has to do with the President’s realization that, in spite of his views and efforts, a 
class-based society had been developing in the countryside since independence – this phenomenon has 
sometimes been referred to as the creation of a “kulak” class among Tanzania’s farmers.
 32 An important 
episode that may have also contributed to the writing of the Declaration was the demonstration, in 
October 1966, by University of Dar es Salaam students against the obligatory six months National 
Service. On this incident see, for example, (Lonsdale, 1968), (Mtei, 2009) and (Minogue, et al., 1974). 
Today, almost 40 years after it was passed by the TANU, the Declaration continues to be a 
captivating document, and one can almost sense the excitement with which it was received by 
Tanzanians, by citizens of other African nations, and by those interested in economic development. Of 
course, some observers – in particular, those that favored the “market-based” approach discussed in 
Section III -- reacted with concern, but at the time they were a clear minority.
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The Arusha Declaration is part manifest, part vision statement, and part policy blueprint. It is a 


















34 The first part is titled “The TANU Creed” and is a declaration of principles that states the 
official party’s main believes and goals. It reiterates Nyerere’s early call for a war on “poverty, ignorance 
and disease,” and states that the government will fight to eradicate all types of exploitation, 
discrimination, bribery, and corruption. From a historical perspective, it is interesting that it vows to 
“actively assist in the formation and maintenance of co-operative organizations.” In 1976, less than ten 
years after the Declaration was launched agriculture cooperatives were prohibited.   
Part Two of the Declaration deals with “The Policy of Socialism,” and asserts that a requirement 
for building a socialist society is that most “means of production” should be owned by the state. It then 
provides a long list of affected means of production that includes land, forests, minerals, water, oil and 
electricity, news media, communications, banks, insurance, import and export trade, wholesale trade, iron 
and steel, machine tools, arms, motor cars, cement, fertilizers textiles, large plantations, and “any big 
factory… which provides essential components to other industries.”
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Part three is the lengthiest one and deals with “The Policy of Self-Reliance.” It opens with a long 
and highly pedagogical explanation of how the low level of funding – the document refers to it as 
“money” -- restricts development options. It then points out that relying on foreign aid is not the solution: 
 
“It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know 
only too well that our country is poor. It is equally stupid, indeed it is even more stupid, 
for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of our poverty through foreign assistance 
rather than through our own financial resources.” 
 
It then argues at length that relying on gifts and loans endangers the country’s independence and its 
ability to choose its own policies. The document then provides a drawn out discussion on the perils of 
putting too much emphasis on industries, of thinking that development begins with industrialization. The 
next section of Part Three is suggestively titled “Let us pray and heed to the peasant,” and explains with 
great clarity that the main problem with “import substitution” industrialization is that those that benefit 
from it (urban dwellers and industrial workers) are not the ones that suffer the costs of the policy. 
Industrialization is paid for by peasants. It then says:  
 
“[T]here are various forms of exploitation. We must not forget that people who live in 
towns can possibly become exploiters of those who live in rural areas… There are two 
possible ways of dividing the people in our country. We can put the capitalists and 
feudalists on one side, and the farmers and workers on the other. But we can also divide 
the people into urban dwellers on one side and those who live in the rural areas on the 
other. If we are not careful we might get to the position where the real exploitation in 
Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasants.”   
 
What is remarkable about this extract is that it didn’t take too long for policies to evolve exactly in the 
direction Nyerere deplored with such vehemence. As a number of economists that were engaged in policy 







was that it taxed the agricultural sector in order to finance huge industrial projects. For example, Brian 
Van Arkadie, who was deeply involved in preparing the Second Five-Year Plan has argued that a number 
of policies implemented were inconsistent, and even contradicted, the spirit and explicit goals of the 
Arusha Declaration (Van Arkadie, 1995).  
  Part Four of the Arusha Declaration is very short – it has only two paragraphs -- and establishes 
the policies for “TANU Membership.” The fifth and final part of the Declaration includes a short 
resolution on the principles that the country’s leadership should adhere to. The document states that 
TANU and government leaders could not do the following: (a) own shares in any company; (b) be on the 
board of any privately owned enterprise; (c) receive two or more salaries; or (d) own a house that is 
rented out to others. As former Governor of the Bank of Tanzania and former Finance Minister Edwin 
Mtei has said in his memoirs, these requirements – and especially the prohibition of renting a house – 
created significant problems for many of the government senior officials.  
Immediately after the Declaration was promulgated a number of laws nationalizing the banking, 
insurance, and international trade were passed by parliament. Also laws that expropriated 60% of a 
number of key industries were approved.
36 Some of the specific pieces of legislation included 
Parliament’s Act No.1 of February 15
th, 1967, which nationalized all 9 commercial banks. The same Act 
created the National Bank of Commerce, which from that point on had monopoly power with respect to 
banking and financial activities. Act No.3 of February 16
th, 1967 nationalized 9 milling and import-export 
companies, and amended the National Agricultural Products Board Act of 1964 in order to allow 
government-run marketing boards to act as sole purchasers of different crops. Act No.4, nationalized the 
insurance industry, and Act No. 5, passed on February 15
th, allowed the Minister of Industries, Natural 
Resources and Power to expropriate up to 60% of a number of large companies, including breweries, 
cement companies, shoes manufacturers, mining companies and tobacco companies.  
In the months that followed parliament passed a flourish of legislation aimed at furthering the 
goals of African Socialism and increasing government control over most spheres of economic activity. A 
particularly significant piece of legislation was the Land Acquisition Act of October 1967 that greatly 
reduced the protection of property rights by giving the president the power to “acquire any land… 
required for any public purpose.” Owners whose properties were chosen for purchase had no legal 
recourse and had to sell; compensation was contemplated, but in almost every case it was merely nominal.  
In drafting the Arusha Declaration and in forging the path to African Socialism, Nyerere was 
strongly influenced by China’s experience. He traveled to China for the first time in February 1965, and 
was very impressed by that country’s achievements, including the collectivization of the agricultural 
sector into communes. Even though Nyerere had thought, from very early on, about the importance of 
frugality and of reducing economic dependency, he did not use the term “self reliance” until June of 1965, 
immediately after Zhou Enlai’s visit to Dar es Salaam.
37 Indeed, in the 1964 speech to Parliament 
presenting the First Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development “self reliance” is not 
mentioned at all; he did, however, refer to “African Socialism” once, towards the end of the speech.  
Nyerere returned to China many times. In a 1968 visit he stated that he had “come to China to 
learn.” And, in a 1974 visit to Beijing he said: “[What] encourages me [about the future of socialism in 
Africa] is China. . . China is providing an encouragement and an inspiration for younger and smaller 








To be sure, China was not the only influence in Nyerere’s and his advisors’ thinking on economic 
development and policies. As discussed in some detail in Section III, and as emphasized by N. Mwase 
and B. Ndulu (Mwase, et al., 2008), during the late 1960s and 1970s policy making in Tanzania was 
greatly influenced by a number of development economists that argued that small and poor countries had 
to rely on strict planning to allocate resources. Reflecting the times, Tanzanian economists and politicians 
emphasized questions related to colonialism and the relation between poor countries in the “periphery,” 
and rich ones in the “center.” Samir Amin, an Egyptian economist, author of “Imperialism and Unequal 
Development” (Le développement inégal), was particularly influential, as were Immanuel Wallerstein, 
and Andre Gunder Frank.
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In spite of the influence of Neo-Marxist intellectuals in his rhetoric and vision formulations, and 
in spite of its unmistakable quest for building a socialist society --remember the opening of the Arusha 
Declaration: “The policy of the TANU is to build a socialist state.”--, Nyerere’s own thinking was, 
clearly, non-Marxist. Indeed, the fact that he was catholic and a humanist, as well as his insistence of 
forging a national identity that went beyond tribal and ethnic origin, made him particularly attractive to 
Nordic donors.
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IV.2.1 The Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. 
The specific policies for implementing the Arusha Declaration were summarized in the Second 
Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1969-1974. At the aggregate level, the main 
objective of the plan was a rate of growth of GDP of 6.5% per annum. The document recognized that this 
was an ambitious objective, but one that, according to Nyerere, could be achieved “through a maximum 
effort by the Government, the parastatal organizations and the rural masses” (p. 2). The plan also called 
for a significant increase in the rate of industrialization, with a yearly rate of growth of 11% for the 
manufacturing sector. According to the Plan, the goal of expanding the industrial sector was almost 
exclusively the responsibility of the National Development Corporation, the most important of the 
parastatals. Investment was to increase from 22% to 25% of (monetary) GDP, and the annual trade deficit 
was to average 4% of GDP. A fascinating aspect of the plan was that, in line with the ideas of self 
sacrifice and self reliance, it called for zero growth of imports of consumer goods during the five year 
period.
41 This was to happen in a country that was supposed to experience an increase in real income of 
almost 50% in five years! 
According to the Second Plan, and in line with the principles set out in the Arusha Declaration, 
the core of Tanzania’s economic and social strategy was rural development, including a major effort to 
increase agriculture’s production. Indeed, according to African Socialism strategists the agricultural 
sector would become so dynamic that it would generate the “surplus” required to finance major 
investments in the manufacturing sector and, thus, achieve one of the most ambitious goals of the Plan: 
“the contribution of industry to gross domestic product… [will] increase seven-fold in the period 1968/69 















But increasing agricultural output was not the only goal of the rural development strategy. As 
important, if not more important, was villagization or the agglomeration of peasants in planned 
communities or ujamaa villages. Indeed, villagization was seen as a policy that would help achieve the 
ambitious agricultural growth targets. In that regard it is worth quoting the Second Plan extensively:
43 
 
“The objective [of ujamaa villages] is to farm the village land collectively with modern 
techniques of production… The equality of farmers in ujamaa communities, with no 
divisive class distinctions, creates a healthy and stable social system where exploitation 
and inequality can be eliminated… Until recently the trend has been in the opposite 
direction… towards the development of a class system in the rural area.” 
 
This is how A.R. Roe, an outside observer and a supporter of the Tanzanian experiment with 
African Socialism, commented on the villagization effort:
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“This self-help, labor-intensive program having many parallels with Chinese agricultural 
organization is the latest feature to be built into Tanzania’s personalized version of 
African Socialism, but it is also the most unique and exciting feature. The contrast with 
the capital intensive “village settlement” scheme of the previous plan could not be 
greater, but there is little doubt that the change is potentially a change in the right 
direction.” 
 
Roe’s enthusiasm for villagization was, by no means, unique; it was shared by many analysts and 
development experts. More importantly, the plan was praised by aid agencies, which during the early 
years provided substantial resources for its implementation.  Indeed, in light of the program’s failure –
what was to be a voluntary reallocation became, in a few years, a forced and obligatory one --, it is 
surprising that initially there was no voice in the aid community (or, at least not a prominent voice) that 
expressed doubts or skepticism about it. Several World Bank documents, and in particular those related to 
loans, mentioned the fact that villagization was running into some technical difficulties due to its 
ambitiousness, but no real criticism – and, of course, no indictment – of the program can be found in 
documents or reports from those years. 
In 1972 the government launched the Basic Industrial Strategy, aimed at accelerating the creation 
of an industrial base that, within the context of the overall import substitution industrialization approach, 
would satisfy domestic demand for consumption goods, and provide the bases for a heavy industrial 
sector. At the same time the Small Industries Development Organization was created to encourage, 
through a number of subsidies, small-size industrial firms that would produce a variety of light-
manufactured goods. In determining which specific industries to promote, protect, and subsidize, the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Planning performed a number of exercises using an input-output 
table that had been constructed in 1970.  
In 1973 and in an effort to curb rapidly increasing inflation, the National Price Commission 
(NPC) was created with the goal of controlling prices at every level of the economy.







controlled more than 3,000 prices, both at the retail and wholesale levels. What is remarkable is that it did 
this without having the appropriate personnel. Indeed, in over seven years of operation the NPC was only 
able to hire two qualified cost accountants.
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The effort to extract an increasing surplus from the rural sector is illustrated in Figure 4 that 
shows the evolution of the three year moving average of domestic producer prices, as a proportion of 
export prices, for coffee, cotton, and tobacco. As may be seen, in all three crops producer prices declined 
significantly, as a fraction of export prices: for coffee producer prices went from 57% to 28%, for cotton 
they declined from 27% to 20%, and for tobacco from 66% to 50%.
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The agricultural sector was not only affected by a decline in relative prices, but also by a severe 
reduction in capital accumulation: between 1976 and 1981 real investment in the agricultural sector 
declined by 37%. In addition, the collapse of transport infrastructure – mostly due to lack of maintenance 
– hampered distribution. During the late 1970s and early 1980s it was common for crops not reaching 
markets because of the inadequacy of transport. As a result of this some peasants withdraw partially from 
the monetized economy, moving towards subsistence production-cum-barter; the majority of farmers, 
however, resorted to using “unofficial” or “black” markets. By the late 1980s the spread between official 
and unofficial (or black market) prices had widened significantly, reaching in some cases (cassava) 
almost 300%. (Ndulu, et al., 1984), (Raikes, 1986). 
As the years progressed it became abundantly clear that the government’s rural development 
policies were not working. Agricultural production was stagnant or declining–a severe drought in 1973-74 
contributed to the sector’s dismal performance--, and a large number of peasants were resisting the 
villagization program. The government’s reaction was to implement a forced villagization process in 
1974-75, and prohibiting agricultural cooperatives in 1976 -- these were replaced by national “crop 
authorities,” or marketing boards that became increasingly inefficient and corrupt.
48 At the same time, 
large and grandiose industrial and infrastructure projects were being implemented with funding from the 
international aid agencies. As J. Boesen et al. (Boesen, et al., 1986 p. 22) have pointed out, many of these 
projects “were later criticized [by the aid community] as contributors to the crisis.”  
With agricultural stagnating and manufacturing barely growing, the overall economy also 
performed poorly. As may be seen from Table 5, where a set of indicators is presented, GDP growth per 
capita in 1969-1974 averaged only 0.66%. This was significantly below the 3.7% average projected in the 
Second Five Year Plan.  
By 1974 the country faced a serious balance of payments crisis – See Table 5 for figures on 
imports and exports as percentages of GDP. That year net international reserves declined to the equivalent 
of 6.2 weeks of imports, from almost 20 weeks in 1973.In addition to the disincentives faced by local 
farmers, the first oil shock and a serious drought contributed to this state of affairs. In 1975, however, a 
spike in world coffee prices provided some breathing room, and temporary relief. By 1976 net reserves 










1978 Brazil’s coffee production increased very significantly, and international prices were back to 
normal; Tanzania’s penuries were once again evident.
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IV. 2.2 Foreign aid and the early years of African Socialism  
As noted in Section III, during the years that followed the Arusha Declaration foreign aid flows 
skyrocketed. In inflation-adjusted per capita terms net official aid went from USD 22.6 in 1967 to USD 
65.3 in 1974, to USD 82.0 in 1982. Without the large flows of international aid the Arusha Declaration 
would have been just another Third World manifesto. Instead, it became the bases for one of the most 
ambitious political, social and economic experiments in Africa; also, one of the most costly.  
As shown in Section III most of the bilateral assistance came from the Nordic countries. In 1967 
Swedish academic Goran Hydén referred to Tanzania as the “shining star” of Africa.
50 Lennart 
Klackenberg, Sweden’s State Secretary for Development Cooperation, became a strong advocate of 
Tanzania, as did Olaf Palme who was Prime Minister from 1968 through 1976, and again from 1982 until 
1986, when he was assassinated.    
The World Bank’s initial reaction to the Arusha Declaration was guarded and matter of fact. In a 
1968 report the Bank described the change in policies in a rather cold and removed way, and indicated 
that although the nationalization of banks, insurance companies and large manufacturing firms had 
created uncertainty, the government decision to compensate owners was seen as a positive sign by the 
international community.
51 A few years later, however, the Bank had also fallen under Tanzania’s and 
Nyerere’s spell.  According to a 1973 Country Program Note:
52 
 
“From a donor’s point of view Tanzania comes close to being a model development 
country in the sense that the government is seriously committed to develop in a climate of 
political and social stability… Development policies and priorities are generally well 
thought and well conceived… We are inclined to give Tanzania an excellent performance 
ratting…”   
 
In the World Bank semi-official history, (Kapur, et al., 1997 p. 713) argue that even those Bank 
officials that had doubts regarding the radicalization of policies during the mid 1970s, set their 
“reservations aside and emerged as… enthusiastic supporter of Tanzania’s development strategy.” This 
was reflected both in the Bank’s lending program, which jumped from USD 96 million in 1972/73 to 
USD 315 million in 1974/77, as well as by Bank’s publications and official releases.
53 This deep 
admiration for Nyerere and his policies, quite irrespectively of whether they worked and improved the 
wellbeing of the Tanzanian citizens, became so generalized that it even received a name: “the cult of 
Tanzaphilia.”
54 
After the Arusha Declaration, Nordic bilateral aid also changed in nature, moving from the 
provision of experts and supporting educational programs (including the respected and well known 











large scale projects in sectors such as transportation, fisheries, cement, timber, and electricity. At the same 
time, social programs, including those related to health and education got a very low percentage of total 
assistance.
55 Projects were mostly selected in the Nordic countries by aid experts, and were later discussed 
with the Tanzanian authorities in Dar es Salaam. The association between donors and recipients was, on 
the surface, a partnership. But as J. Simensen (Simensen, 2010) has pointed out, this was largely an 
illusion; it was really a paternalistic “gift relationship.”   
Perhaps, the most succinct and powerful statement summarizing the relationship between African 
Socialism and Nordic aid programs has been provided by Bagachwa, Mbelle and Van Arkadie, who in 
1992 wrote: “If the Arusha experiment had not existed, the western social democrats in the 1970s would 
have invented it”.
56 
From today’s perspective it is surprising – not to say disturbing – that in the 1970s the aid 
agencies did not question Tanzania’s development strategy based on using agricultural “surplus” to 
finance an oversized, inefficient industrial sector, nor did they ask whether it made sense – from and 
economic, social and humane perspective -- moving 13 million people from their ancestral homesteads to 
planned villages, in order to fulfill the goals of the villagization program.  
IV.2.3 Stagnation and the Third Five Year Plan for Social and Economic Development  
In 1977, ten years after the Arusha Declaration had been approved with great fanfare, Tanzania 
was facing a deep crisis. Agricultural production was down, inflation was significantly up, shortages were 
developing at every level, and there were daily blackouts in every region of the country. In addition, a 
pervasive black market for foreign exchange and consumer goods had emerged, and a very large trade 
deficit had developed. See Table 5 for the evolution of the most important economic variables for the 
1969-1978 period.
57  
Most of the grandiose industrial projects financed by the aid community were facing difficulties, 
and the majority of state owned factories were running at a very low rate of capacity utilization. But this 
was not all: the villagization program, which was the ideological backbone of the country’s movement 
towards self reliance and its unique brand of socialism, had not worked as expected. Instead of voluntarily 
moving to the new villages, many peasants preferred to stay in their old shambas. This was for a number 
of reasons, including the fact that many of them had to travel on foot many kilometers from the village to 
their plots, and because often the newly assigned land was not as fertile as the traditional plots. One of the 
consequences of forcing peasants out of their homes was a rapid decline in agricultural production and 
exports. A Nordic evaluation of the impact of villagization, undertaken in the mid 1980s, points out to a 
number of problems that, in retrospect, should have been evident from early on.
 58  
During 1974-75 East Africa was affected by a severe drought that greatly impacted the 
agricultural sector. The situation was so serious that a number of analysts have argued that much of the 
population was on the brink of starvation. Maize production was particularly affected, and the National 










The third Five Year Plan for Social and Economic Development was launched on July 1
st, 1976.
59  
This document differs markedly, both in style and degree of enthusiasm, from its two predecessors. 
President Nyerere did not present it formally either to parliament or to the CCM (which had replaced 
TANU as the official party).  
During the late 1970s, and as profits from state owned firms and crop authorities declined, the 
government ran increasingly large deficits. These were partially financed through money creation by the 
Bank of Tanzania, with the resulting inflationary pressures and further erosion of competitiveness. By 
1977, and in spite of the goal of becoming self reliant, almost 60% of Tanzania’s development budget 
was financed with foreign aid.  
As a result of an acutely overvalued exchange rate and an out of control public deficit, 
international reserves declined rapidly.  By 1978 total (net) international reserves were equivalent to only 
3.5 weeks of imports, down from more than 30 weeks of imports in 1969. Although, as noted, there was 
no single explanation for these developments, there is little doubt that the government policies – policies 
that were supported and financed by the donor community – were at the very center of the collapse of the 
Tanzanian economy. 
60  
When, in October of 1978, the Ugandan forces of Idi Amin invaded the Kagera region, the 
Tanzanian economy was weak and extremely vulnerable. 
 
V.-    Crisis and the IMF Stand-by program of 1986 
The expulsion of the IMF Mission in November 1979 put the World Bank in a bind. In the 
absence of a Fund program it was difficult for the Bank to maintain its flow of aid to Tanzania. In order to 
deal with this situation, in 1980 Robert S. McNamara, the Bank President, decided to appoint a three-
person high-level commission – the so called Tanzania Advisory Group (TAG) -- to help improve the 
relationship between Nyerere’s government and the IMF. The idea was to get the two sides talking again, 
and to see if they could come to an agreement that would result in Fund financial and technical support.
61 
The TAG had a technical secretariat that included Brian Van Arkadie, a long term advisor to the 
government, John Loxley from Canada, and Samuel Wangwe, a distinguished Tanzanian economist. 
Gerry Helleiner, who had been the first director at the Economic Research Bureau at the 
University of Dar Es Salaam between 1966 and 1968, and who was the only economist in the 
commission, recalls that one of the most important goals of the TAG was to convince Nyerere that the 
Shilling had become hopelessly out of line with fundamentals, and that a substantial devaluation was 
required to tackle the growing trade imbalance. This, however, was easier said than done. At the end, the 
“wise men” commission wrapped up its work without succeeding, and the gulf between the government 
and the IMF was even greater.
62 This impasse continued until 1986, after Nyerere had been replaced as 
president by Ali Hassan Mwinyi. By then, however, the collapse of the economy was almost complete.  
V.1 The resistance to devaluation: ideology and believes 
In 1979, when the IMF Mission was unceremoniously asked to leave the country, Tanzania was 
in the brink of bankruptcy. Although the Second Five-Year Plan called for a reasonable trade deficit – at 









high as 17% of GDP – one of the highest recorded by any country in the post World War period. Why did 
the authorities reject the idea of a large devaluation with such vehemence? Why did they rule out 
exchange rate adjustments even in light of the clear imbalances?  
Avoiding an exchange rate adjustment was not an issue of absolute principle or dogma. In fact, 
prior to the impasse with the IMF in late 1979 Tanzania had implemented a series of small (or mini) 
devaluations. In early 1973 the Shilling peg to the USD came to an end, and the local currency was 
instead pegged to the SDR. Starting in 1974 several small adjustments (depreciations) to the parity were 
made. Also, until that time Tanzania had had a fairly good relation with the IMF. Indeed, during 1974-75 
it used the first two tranches of its Fund quota, and received two loans amounting 41 million SDRs. None 
of these operations was subject to conditionality.  
In late 1979, when the IMF Mission arrived in Dar es Salaam to discuss a possible loan and the 
concomitant adjustment policies, the so-called “effective” – or “official” – exchange rate was 8.24 
Shillings per USD. The black market premium stood at 43.6%, a figure that at the time was considered to 
be extremely high. In December of that year, and after Minister Mtei’s resignation and the breakdown of 
negotiations with the Fund were announced, the black market premium jumped to 64.3%. 
According to Edwin Mtei, opposing the (large) devaluation suggested by the IMF in 1979 was not 
Nyerere’s own idea. Mtei writes:
63  
 
“[President Nyerere] was prepared to accept most of the [IMF] proposed financial 
assistance measures ... [However] he was adamantly opposed to the devaluation of the 
Tanzania Shilling. It was apparent to me that he was being advised by other persons 
against doing anything affecting the exchange rate…” 
 
In a speech to the diplomatic corps on New Year’s Day, 1980, barely a month after he had thrown 
the IMF out of the country, Nyerere lashed out at the international institution, and said:
64 
 
“Tanzania is not prepared to devalue its currency just because this is a traditional free 
market solution to everything and regardless of the merits of our position. It is not 
prepared to surrender its right to restrict imports by measures designed to ensure that we 
import quinine rather than cosmetics, or buses rather than cars for the elite… [O]ur price 
controls may not be the most effective in the world, but we will not abandon price 
control; we will only strive to make it more efficient. And above all we shall continue 
with our endeavors to build a socialist society.  
 
Reginald H. Green (Green, 1995), one of Nyerere’s most trusted economic advisors, has argued 
that the president’s rejection of devaluation had much to do with dignity. According to him, Nyerere was 
incensed by the arrogant and coercive way in which the IMF mission demanded policy changes. Former 






staff, has strongly denied this. According to him, Bo Karlstrom, the chief of the Mission, was extremely 
respectful and courteous.
65 
One of the main intellectual forces behind Tanzania’s opposition to devaluation was Kighoma 
Malima, a Princeton-trained economist that became minister of planning and finance in 1980. Malima 
was charismatic and articulate, and was one of the first African lecturers in economics at the University of 
Dar es Salaam. Interestingly, his earlier research based on econometric models, suggested that Tanzanian 
peasants were highly responsive to the type of price incentives that a (large) devaluation would have 
produced. Malima finished his Ph.D. dissertation on the cotton industry in Tanzania in 1971, under the 
guidance of future Nobel Prize winner W.A. Lewis. After estimating a series of distributed-lags supply 
response models he wrote that, “cotton farmers in Tanzania have been found to be fairly responsive to the 
long-run expected ‘normal’ cotton price.”
66  More specifically, his econometric work suggested that the 
price elasticity of total output in Tanzania was a very high 2.44.
67   
With time, however, Malima grew increasingly skeptical about the effectiveness of price 
incentives, and became convinced that changes in the exchange rate were counterproductive. His position 
was affected by structuralist views that at the time, and as noted in Section III, were quite popular among 
development economists. This perspective was overly critical of the IMF, which was considered to have a 
dogmatic approach that treated all countries similarly, and ignored the social and distributional 
consequences of devaluation. This view gained currency around the world after the 1982 Mexican crisis 
and devaluation.
68   
Cambridge (UK) economist Ajit Singh, an advisor to the government, was one of the most 
fervent opponents to devaluing the Shilling. His argument was in two parts: First, he fully attributed the 
crisis to external factors – the war with Uganda, which according to some estimates had a cost of USD 1.5 
billion, the collapse of the East African Community, the drought of 1973/74, and the deterioration of the 
terms of trade. Second, and more importantly, Singh argued that devaluation would not work for a 
number of structural and political reasons, including the fact that under a centrally planned economy the 
authorities allocated foreign exchange in a direct (and often political) way, and markets were not 
respondent to price incentives.
69  
A recurrent point made by the opponents of devaluation – including Minister Malima -- was that 
an exchange rate adjustment would not improve Tanzania’s international terms of trade.
70 Although this 
was correct, it was immaterial, as the key question was whether devaluation would improve the domestic 
relative price of tradable goods, and thus provide the incentives for increasing agricultural output and 
exports. In an article written in the early 1980s, and published in 1985, Malima argued that even if the 
relative prices of tradables improved (a point he was not willing to concede easily), it was not clear that 
farmers would react positively to such changes. This, of course, contradicted the results that he had 
obtained in his Princeton doctoral dissertation, but that didn’t seem to concern him.  
Skepticism about (nominal) exchange rate adjustments was also related to possible 
“contractionary” effect of devaluations, a subject first brought up in a systematic way by Albert 
Hirschman in 1949 (Hirschman, 1949), and later developed by Diaz Alejandro (Diaz Alejandro, 1963). 
Contractionary devaluations have, of course, political implications and may even unleash highly 
destabilizing forces. This political concern was, in many ways, at the core of Ajit Singh’s argument for 









current account may balance… [H]owever, even if this were to happen, this may generate socially 
unacceptable rates of inflation and income distribution.”
71  
Opponents to devaluing the Shilling also criticized the other components of the IMF and World 
Bank policy recommendations, including the call for liberalizing interest rates and imports, removing 
price controls, reducing government expenditures, and reforming parastatals.
72 In a 1985 paper – 
delivered a few months before the government agreed to a Stand-by Program with the IMF – Malima 
argued that the timing and speed of the adjustment program was important. He asked rhetorically: “What 
is the appropriate dose which cures the illness without killing the patient?”  
The idea that peasants didn’t respond significantly to price incentives was popular among a 
number of development economists in spite of the fact that there was a voluminous literature that showed 
that this was not the case. Indeed, in his path breaking 1953 book Penny Capitalism, University of 
Chicago anthropologist Sol Tax showed that very poor Guatemalan peasants responded to price 
incentives in ways similar to significantly more educated farmers in the advanced nations. Also, 
econometric work undertaken in the 1960s by T.W. Schultz and many of his students, showed that 
peasants’ supply response to price changes and other monetary incentives was substantial. In spite of this 
evidence, still during the 1970s many development experts still adhered to the traditional “low 
elasticities” view. The publication, in 1981, of Robert Bates book Markets and States in Tropical Africa 
was particularly influential in this regard. In the preface to a new edition Bates (Bates, 2005 p. X) wrote: 
“[I] assume[d] that farmers – even peasant farmers – respond to economic incentives. I was willing to 
make this assumption because, having lived in village communities, I knew it to be true.”       
V.2   The gathering storm and the IMF  
The IMF’s Article XIV Consultation Report of April 1978 barely mentions the currency issue, 
and when it does, it concludes that in the medium term the “appropriateness” of the exchange rate should 
be kept under review.
 73 In many ways this is surprising, since, as already noted, at that point the black 
market premium was already substantial – it hovered around 100% --, and the exports sector was in 
shambles. The Fund should have made clear that attaining “a substantially strengthened export base” 
required a major improvement in competitiveness, and that this, in turn, could be achieved rapidly and 
effectively through a nominal devaluation that was accompanied by the appropriate policies. Moreover, it 
is surprising that the report doesn’t address forcefully the issue of incentives to agricultural producers – at 
the time producer prices were at one of the lowest points relative to export prices --, or the effects of 
forced villagization on productivity and agricultural sector performance.  
In 1979 the IMF expressed renewed concern about the performance of the economy. The Article 
IV Consultation report, presented to the Board on August 29
th, 1979 – that is, only a few months before 
the Mission was expelled from Dar es Salaam by President Nyerere – points out that the public sector 
deficit was dangerously out of control, and was being financed with money creation. The tone of this 
report is quite different from that of the Article XIV consultation of 1978. There was now a clear sense of 
urgency, and it was argued that in order to get out of the crisis the government had to “implement on a 
sustained basis comprehensive policies to eliminate the structural distortions which have hampered 
Tanzania’s balanced economic growth.”  No mention was made, however, of the need to devalue the 
currency.
 74   
In April 1980, merely 5 months after the IMF’s mission had been expelled from the country, the 







that his institution wanted to find a way out of the impasse. In September of that year an agreement that 
included fiscal adjustment but not devaluation as a condition, was reached. Arriving at this agreement was 
particularly important, since it allowed the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies to release funds that 
were in the pipeline, and permitted commercial banks to rollover some loans. The government, however, 
was unable to meet any of the IMF conditions – most of them referred to fiscal adjustment --, and only 
SDR40 million were disbursed out of a SDR 180 million loan. Tanzania was, once again, cut-off from 
multilateral assistance, and continued to suffer from a deep and protracted crisis.   
In the early 1980s a generalized black market for food developed, with “unofficial” prices 
exceeding by a substantial margin prices set by the government. Only highly connected individuals – 
government authorities, parastatal managers, and high officials of the CCM – were able to purchase goods 
at the (significantly below market) controlled prices.   
As the 1980s unfolded the opponents to a large devaluation and adjustment continued to dominate 
the cabinet, and no meaningful action was undertaken. Economic conditions worsened considerably, as 
the foreign exchange constraint became tighter and production collapsed further. Imports could not be 
paid and foreign suppliers refused to deliver their cargoes without prepayment. Oil tankers would stay in 
the Dar es Salaam harbor for weeks at a time waiting for their monies. A well known story is that of an oil 
company that delivered its cargo only when it was promised that it would receive coffee as payment.  
Throughout this period Nyerere dealt with the adjustment issue and the IMF demands from a 
purely political position. He saw the situation – and said so repeatedly – as a fight between a small 
developing country that sought dignity and independence, and an international bully controlled by the 
major capitalistic powers. In this struggle he got support from the so called “like minded” countries, from 
the International Labor Office and, for some time, from the Nordic donors and, especially, from 
Sweden.
75 As time passed and economic conditions worsened, a small group of political dissenters -- 
mostly technocrats and producers of cash crops -- began to emerge.
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After the failed efforts of the Tanzania Advisory Group to mediate between the IMF and Nyerere, 
a number of home grown adjustment programs were put in place. These programs drew on some of the 
technical work done by the TAG Secretariat, and some included small and timid devaluations (in 1982, 
1983 and 1984) and producer price adjustments, but didn’t addressed the main sources of disequilibrium. 
These programs had impressive names, such as the National Economic Survival Program of 1981 (NESP 
I), the National Economic Survival Program of 1982 (NESP II), and the Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) of 1983. None of them, however, made a true attempt at reforming the parastatals. Moreover, as 
time went by, the fiscal deficit continued to swell, import restrictions became asphyxiating, and the black 
market got out of control. The half-baked policies of these various programs were combined with new 
efforts at further controlling the economy, and punishing (through the Economics Saboteurs Act) those 
individuals deemed to oppose the path chosen by the authorities.   
Table 6 presents data on key macroeconomic indicators for 1979-1985, the years between the 
failed IMF Mission led by Bo Karlstrom, and the implementation of the Stand-by agreement. These 
figures portray a very negative picture. Reality, however, was even worse than what the bleak figures in 
Table 6 are able to convey. It is not an exaggeration to say that economic relations had completely broke 
down. The worst were the generalized shortages and electricity blackouts that made everyday life 
miserable for the average citizen, and especially for the average housewife.
77 Contrary to what Nyerere 
had envisaged and the TANU had approved in early 1967 when the Arusha Declaration was passed, the 
rural sector had completely collapsed. From a political economy perspective, the generalized shortages – 






public services greatly affected the situation. Some groups that, in theory, should have supported taxing 
agriculture and maintaining an overvalued currency, began to question the wisdom of stubbornly holding 
on to the failed policies of the past.
78 These included that rank and file of the civil service that couldn’t 
buy food, or other goods, for that matter, at official prices.
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In 1984-85, and in light of the continued crisis, Norway and Finland, the staunchest Nordic 
backers of the government, decided to withdraw their financial support —Sweden and the Netherlands 
had began reducing their aid since 1980.
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In 1985, virtually cut off from the rest of the world, Nyerere was in a bind. He decided to follow a 
two part strategy: on the one hand he announced that he would not stand for reelection as president. He 
would, however, remain as chairman of CCM, which, in turn, would continue to be the only allowed 
political party.  On the other hand, he would try to pave the way to improved relations with the Bretton 
Woods institutions. 
V.3  The tide turns: changing views regarding development economics in the 1980s 
In the early 1980s, and as Tanzania was grappling with the consequences of reduced foreign aid, 
major changes in the way economists thought about economic development were taking place. Since the 
mid to late 1970s the long-held  planning view began to be questioned by an increasingly larger number 
of experts that ventured that “government failures” were more pervasive, generalized and costly than 
“market failures.” Suddenly, the “market approach” to economic development gained currency, and there 
were calls, from many quarters, for trade liberalization, deregulation, and the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. Of course, supporters of the planning approach defended their views energetically, and argued 
that the dismal performance of most economies in Africa and Latin America was not the result of 
misguided policies, but of a hostile external environment. Also, and as expected, those groups that had the 
most to lose if liberalizing reforms were implemented defended existing policies (and the rents that these 
policies generated) with vigor.  
In 1981 two major and highly influential publications presaged the change in views regarding 
economic development in Africa: The World Bank’s Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
An Agenda for Action, universally known as “the Berg Report” after its main author, Elliot Berg, and 
Robert Bates’ Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. 
Although very different in terms of their genesis and objectives, these two books made a simple and yet 
powerful point: the dismal performance of the African economies was, mostly (but not exclusively) the 
result of bad policies that put bureaucrats interests ahead of those of the people, and that had stifled 
incentives for growth, innovation and productivity improvements. Also, both works pointed out that 
African governments were far from the benign entities that tried to maximize society’s welfare, as 
assumed in planning models. Government bureaucrats – including the managing echelons of parastatals, 
marketing boards and state–owned banks – captured the state apparatus and used it for their own benefit, 
as well as for that of their immediate supporters, families and friends. Both of these works were 
particularly critical of African policies towards the agricultural sector.  
The publication of the “Berg Report” generated a strong reaction among African governments 
and their supporters. Its insistence that external factors were unimportant was at odds with the position 
espoused by the African nations in the “Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa,” a 
document also released in 1981 (but signed a year earlier). The Plan for Action attributed the region’s 
penuries to the external shocks and the instability of the world economy. In addition, it stated that former 






  During the first half of the 1980s these two contrasting views on economic development would 
coexist and battle each other. However, as economic conditions deteriorated, the support for the “planning 
approach” and the Lagos Plan of Action gradually eroded. By the mid-1980s it was clear that the war of 
ideas had taken a significant turn, and that the until then unpopular “market approach” was gaining more 
and more followers. Supporters of the status quo in Tanzania, or other countries, didn’t give up power 
easily, however. As will be seen below, by the early 1990s, and led by Kighoma Malima, the supporters 
of socialist policies regrouped and did all they could to stall the reform process. 
V.4  The IMF Stand-by program of 1986 
In 1984 the government decided to open a small window towards the world, and unveiled a 
mechanism for importing some products using “own foreign exchange.” The list of eligible goods 
included spare parts, some capital equipment, building materials, electrical appliances, shoes, textiles, 
pickup trucks, and buses.
81 Although small and very limited in scope, the “own foreign exchange” 
imports program was extremely successful. By relaxing a draconically severe foreign exchange constraint 
it allowed some companies to resume production and some shops to have a limited number of goods for 
sale. This was immediately noticed by the public, and, in particular, by the middle class, including 
government officials. This had the important political effect of weakening the support of the orthodox 
camp that from inside the government resisted any change in policy direction, and strengthened the 
position of the reformers.  
On August 28
th, 1986, almost seven years after the mission led by Bo Karlstrom had been thrown 
out of Dar es Salaam by president Nyerere, Tanzania’s made an official request for an IMF Stand-by 
Arrangement.  




“Protracted, and at time difficult, negotiations have been held between the Tanzanian 
authorities and the Fund staff during most of the 1980s… In early 1986, following the 
election of the new President and the formation of a new Cabinet, the authorities invited 
the Fund to hold discussions with a view to designing a comprehensive package of 
economic reforms and policy measures that could lead to economic recovery and to a 
sustainable balance of payments in the medium term.  At the same time, the authorities 
also began to prepare their own program of medium term recovery and rehabilitation.”  
 
In terms of its content, the proposed Stand-by program – which in Tanzania was called the 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) -- was quite standard. Disbursements were divided into tranches, 
with most funds available towards the end of the agreement (March 1988). The program called for a 
gradual improvement in the balance of payments position. It mentioned that it anticipated that donors 
would provide increased support, and pointed out that Tanzania was expected to sign a Structural 
Adjustment Loan with the World Bank in October of that year. An important feature of the program was 
that it was very small in terms of resources: it only provided 60% of Tanzania’s quota at the IMF. This 
meager level of assistance reflected two important aspects of the operation: First, there was still a major 
degree of mistrust between the two parties, and the IMF didn’t want to commit a large amount of money 





providing a “seal of approval” and, in that way, unlocking other sources of financing, including, in 
particular, the monies from bilateral donors.    
The center piece of the program was a large devaluation of the Shilling. This was to be supported 
by appropriate fiscal and monetary policies, and was to be accompanied by structural reforms aimed at 
liberalizing the economy, increasing efficiency and productivity, and reigniting growth.  
An initial maxi devaluation was, in fact, a pre-condition for the program. On June 19, 1986 the 
currency was depreciated from 17 Tshs per USD to Tshs 40 per USD. This represented a devaluation of 
the official rate of 58%. The report presented to the IMF Board makes clear that this devaluation “would 
not fully correct for the substantial degree of overvaluation.” Thus, the program called for the adoption of 
a crawling peg regime that implied further adjustments of the parity. The goal of this mini devaluation 
policy was to achieve a 1% real depreciation per month. The report pointed out that the spread in the 
black market for foreign exchange was a good measure of the extent of overvaluation, and that it would 
be monitored closely as a way of assessing whether the currency was moving closer to the exchange rate 
levels supported by fundamentals. Reflecting the lack of confidence in the Tanzanian authorities the 
program called for more frequent reviews than what was normal at the time; initial reviews were 
scheduled for February and June 1987. 
The goals of the program included maintaining the current account deficit at not more than 22% 
of GDP, a rate of inflation of 30% for 1987, an increase in domestic investment to 23% of GDP (from 
16% in the previous year), a modest increase in the holdings of international reserves, and an acceleration 
of GDP growth to 3.5% in 1986/87 -- which implied an increase in GDP per capita of barely 0.5%. In 
terms of interest rate policies the program called for gradual increases that would result in positive real 
rates in two years.   
As one would have expected, the 1986 IMF program was rich in conditionality. In contrast with 
run of the mill programs, conditions (or performance criteria) went beyond pure macroeconomic 
variables, and included a number of measures related to the structural functioning of the economy. The 
most important conditions may be summarized as follows:
83  (a) Reducing drastically the number of 
goods affected by price controls. (b) Reducing the central government cash deficit by 5 to 6 percentage 
points of GDP, to 11% of GDP.
84 (c) New fiscal revenue measures were to be enacted, including a new 
tax on petroleum goods; specific taxes had to be transformed into ad valorem taxes. (d) Broadly defined 
money would expand at 11% in 1986/1987. (e) There would be a gradual reduction in external arrears. (f) 
Credit from the banking system to the seven largest marketing boards (coffee, cotton, tobacco, tea, sisal, 
cashew nuts, and the National Milling Corporation) was to be strictly controlled. (g) A crawling peg 
exchange rate system geared at generating a real devaluation of 1% per year was to be adopted. (h) 
Multiple exchange rate practices were to be eliminated. (i) There would be an expansion of the export 
earnings retention scheme. (j) There would be no imposition of trade or exchange restrictions beyond 
those approved by the Fund through Article XIV consultations. (k) There would be a generalized increase 
in producer prices in the agricultural sector to an average of no less than 60% of export prices. (l) 
Consumer subsidies on petroleum products would be eliminated. (m) There would be a strict ceiling on 









would be a major reform of parastatals and marketing boards operating procedures, in order to increase 
their efficiency, and reducing their losses.
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VI.- The political economy of reform, and the absence of ‘technopols’ in Tanzania 
The timing of the IMF program was consistent with the so-called “crisis theory” of political 
reform. According to this view, major changes in policy direction are typically launched when the country 
is in a “crisis”, usually a “balance of payments crisis that necessitates a reduction in the level of current 
expenditures.”
86  In this regard, Bates and Krueger (Bates, et al., 1993) have argued that “[t]here is no 
recorded instance of the beginning of a reform program at a time when economic growth was satisfactory 
and when the price level and balance of payments situations were stable...  Conditions of economic 
stagnation...or continued deterioration are evidently prerequisites for reform effort.” Along similar lines, 
Rodrik (Rodrik, 1994) has pointed out that historically liberalization reforms have usually followed 
“prolonged macroeconomic crisis...”
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Of course, what sets the experience of Tanzania apart is that in 1986 the country had gone beyond 
the crisis sphere; it had long entered a destruction phase, where normal economic relations within the 
“official sector” had all but disappeared. Indeed, as the crisis deepened a number of economic actors 
began to operate almost exclusively in the “black” or “unofficial” markets; others, especially peasants in 
the most remote regions of the country, bailed-out of the monetary sector, and reverted to a subsistence 
economy.  
An important question, then, is why it took so long for politicians to react to this collapse, and to 
attempt corrective measures.  
The answer to this question comes in several parts: First, the fact that the CMM (and before it the 
TANU) was the official and only political party goes a long way towards explaining the absence of 
(effective) dissenting voices.
88 Second, until quite late in the game – indeed until 1983-1984 – a number 
of bilateral aid agencies, and in particular the Nordic countries, continued to provide substantial financial 
support. These agencies, in turn, had been “captured” by officials and aid workers that were convinced 
that the crisis was mostly the result of external forces. For these aid officials, this was a “justifiable” 
crisis, and it was the agencies’ responsibility to help the country get out of it.
89 Third, in the mid-1980s 
the “war of ideas” – including the debates on which development model was most appropriate --, had not 
concluded, and there were still a significant number of economists that supported interventionist, 
command-type.  
And fourth, there were strong political economy reasons for resisting change. Major economic 
reforms are, first and foremost, political events. When economic policies and institutions change 
drastically, some groups incur large losses and other experience significant gains. The groups bound to 
lose usually organize themselves in order to oppose modernization. In Tanzania, these groups included 
government officials that had command over the surplus captured from farmers, urban dwellers that 
worked in industrial firms, and managers of parastatals, marketing boards and crop authorities, among 
others.
90 On the other side of the ledger, those that were expected to gain from a move towards 
liberalization and market orientation were farmers and other groups that would be positively affected by a 









access to imported goods. Potential winners and losers, however, don’t act in a symmetric way. The 
former, including consumers that are expected to benefit from lower prices of imported goods, are usually 
dispersed, and many times are not fully aware of where there interests lie.
91 Potential losers, on the other 
hand, are connected to politicians in power, and have control over the apparatus of the state. They can use 
government institutions, the media, and other mechanisms to exercise coercion and resist change. Indeed, 
this is precisely the reason why in authoritarian countries – including in countries with a single official or 
semi-official political party – those academics and intellectuals that advocate reform usually have 
difficulties publicizing their ideas.  
As noted, after the IMF mission was expelled from the country the economic crisis deepened 
significantly, and criticism of the government began to emerge. It was not widespread, nor was it directly 
aimed at Nyerere, who continued to be a revered figure, but it was there and it was growing. The 
government’s reaction was a combination of sticks and carrots: First, the government stepped up the 
nationalistic and anti-IMF rhetoric. Second, it provided (additional) favors to key groups in order to shore 
up their support. Party officials were central to this strategy. In the early 1980s the CCM apparatus 
expanded significantly, while party dues declined in real terms.
92 Third, and as noted, a series of 
adjustment programs that addressed some of the causes of the crisis in a rather timid way were put in 
place. The most important of these was the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which was partially 
designed by a group of economists that comprised the Secretariat of the Tanzania Advisory Group in 
1981. And, fourth, legislation against “economic saboteurs” was passed, and those individuals suspected 
of price gouging or hoarding difficult to obtain goods were prosecuted and severely punished. The 
persecution of alleged economic conspirators turned families against families and created an atmosphere 
of distrust and suspicion. 
According to the “crisis hypothesis of reform,” in the midst of an economic emergency, highly 
trained social scientists – the so-called “technopols” --, who in normal times have little or no political 
influence, are called in by politicians and asked to help forge a way out of the country’s predicament. As 
J. Domínguez has argued (Domínguez, 1997 p. 7), all of a sudden, the incoming technopols’ ideas -- 
usually based on the Anglo-Saxon economic tradition -- become highly influential. Of course, technopols 
don’t come out of the blue. They are professional economists, academics, and members of think tanks that 
have participated in policy discussions and wars of ideas during the crisis years. Some of them even work 
in international organizations until they are called back to the country by politicians in a bind or by 
colleagues that request their input in drafting blueprints for reform.  
Possibly, the best known group of technopols are the fabled “Chicago boys” in Chile, a group of 
mostly (but not exclusively) University of Chicago graduates that led the design and implementation of 
Chile’s reforms during 1975-1989.
93 Other groups included the “Club Suizo” team in Colombia, the 
“MIT/Stanford group” in Mexico, the “IESA boys” in Venezuela, and the “Fundación Mediterraneo” 
group in Argentina.
94  Although technopols were particularly prominent in Latin America, they have not 
been restricted to that part of the world. They have also played important roles in Asia – the “Berkeley 
mafia” group in Indonesia – and in Central and Eastern Europe, where teams led by Leszek Balcerovic, 
and Vaclav Klaus played key political roles in Poland and the Czech Republic.    
What is surprising in Tanzania is the (relative) absence of “technopols.”  Of course, that does not 










the war of ideas. There were, indeed, quite a few of them. However, in comparison to other countries in 
other regions, they were less influential and, what is more important (and surprising), once the ERP was 
launched in 1986, and the reforms were initiated, they did not participate in the reform process in cabinet 
or senior positions.  
Bigsten et al. (Bigsten, et al., 2001 p. 371) have argued that during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
“the University of Dar es Salaam had… been weakened – either by the socialist ideology or by 
opportunists within the institution who were eager to please the party leadership.” This overall picture, 
they point out, “contributed to the lack of consolidation of intellectual policy groups within the 
Government or around it.”  This view is endorsed by Holtom (Holtom, 2005 p. 558) who argues that for 
all practical purposes the overwhelming dominance of Nyerere and the party “helped block meaningful 
debate.”  
In late 1983, however, and as the crisis deepened, a small group of professional economists – 
most of them academics -- began to play a more active role, and to consider alternative policy options. 
They provided intellectual support to the very few party and government officials that promoted reforms 
and an improvement of the relations with the IMF and the World Bank. These officials included Cleopa 
Msuya, who was the Minister of Finance at the time the Stand-by arrangement was signed, the Permanent 
Secretary of Finance, Rutihinda, and Edwin Mtei, who was Tanzania’s representative at the IMF and had 
been the founding governor of the Bank of Tanzania. At the same time, a crop of newly minted PhDs in 
economics was returning to Tanzania from the Anglo Saxon countries, and urged changes in policy 
directions.
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In late February 1984 the Economics Department and Economic Research Bureau of the 
University of Dar es Salaam held a three day workshop, funded by the Danish aid agency, to discuss 
possible solutions to the economic crisis. Although the papers presented at the workshop were prepared 
by academics, the government was not completely absent from the event: the workshop was opened by 
Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs Kighoma Malima and by the governor of the Central Bank 
C.M. Nyirabu. In his remarks Malima used a decisively political tone and argued, as he had done many 
times during the previous years, that the main causes of the country’s difficulties were external. In terms 
of solutions, he pointed out that “submissively” following the IMF policies would not solve the crisis. 
Further, he stated that “planning, rather than leaving everything to the whims of the free market, is the 
only effective means of solving our economic difficulties.” He then added that “the belief that our 
economic difficulties could be overcome by crossing over to the ‘capitalistic’ mode of resource 
allocation, as already clamored by some foreign apologists and their domestic imitators, is not only 
misguided, but misplaced illusion.”
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During the workshop, and in spite of the overly political tone of Malima’s opening speech, the 
discussion was intense and highly professional. The papers used the language of modern economics and 
were somewhat technical; none of them used Marxist or Neo-Marxists terminology. The topics discussed 
included how to deal with the foreign exchange crisis, the budget imbalance, pricing policies in 
agriculture, the savings gap, the costs and effects of shortages and black markets, the provision of social 
services, and taxation. Interestingly, the published proceedings, which were made available by the 
University that same year, didn’t include all the papers. In particular, the two more controversial ones, on 
foreign exchange shortages (by N.H.I. Lipumba and S. Bano) and the government budget (by F. 
Mtatifikolo), are missing.








glimpse of the type of discussion that was taking place in Tanzania at the time. It is clear that the ten 
authors agreed that inadequate domestic policies were at the core of the crisis. This doesn’t mean, of 
course, that the workshop participants completely dismissed the role of external shocks – indeed they 
explicitly mentioned them, several times --, but they did not put the onus of the crisis on them. The 
authors also recognized that in order to solve the country’s problems it was necessary to rapidly realign 
prices, especially in agriculture and in the foreign exchange market.  
In what is undoubtedly the boldest (published) contribution to the seminar, Nguyuru Lipumba 
pointed out that extremely low productivity growth – and not a slow rate of capital accumulation – was 
behind the country’s dismal performance. He argued that low productivity, in turn, was the result of 
inefficient parastatals and crop authorities (which were significantly less efficient than the cooperatives 
they replaced). He also argued that the government’s efforts to imprison so-called “economic saboteurs” 
had backfired, creating even greater shortages and higher black market prices: “Scarcity of goods and 
price controls have made illegal trade the most profitable economic activity.” (Lipumba, 1984 p. 31). He 
also lashed at the CMM for not attempting to reduce costs, ignoring the plights of the people, and 
supporting the creation of new parastatals (the National Urban Water Agency and the Rural Electric 
Supply Company) that did not contribute to economic growth.   
In many ways, the workshop proceedings constituted a blueprint for reform, and anticipated many 
of the policies that were to be undertaken in the years to come. In particular, the already mentioned 
contribution by Nguyuru Lipumba, made broad proposals that dealt with the currency crisis, the decline in 
productivity and the lack of incentives. And yet, it is still true that, in spite of this workshop and the 
proposals that emanated from it, Tanzania didn’t have a cadre of technopols that, when the reforms were 
finally put in place, were given political responsibility by the country’s leadership. Indeed, none of the 
economists that presented papers at the workshop, and that defied the party and government authority by 
making proposals for reform, became cabinet ministers. Ironically, a few years later, and in the midst of 
the reform effort, Kighoma Malima, who, as we have seen, strenuously opposed any changes in policy or 
approach, was appointed Minister of Finance.  
  
VII.-    The wheels of aid and the first round of reforms, 1986-1995. 
In late 1986, and as a result of the signing of the Stand-by Agreement with the IMF, the wheels of 
the aid machinery began to spin once again. The World Bank approved a major loan (the Multisector 
Rehabilitation Credit for USD 300 million) that included, as conditions, the seeds of the liberalization 
reforms, and the bilateral donors released the monies that had withheld since 1985.  
The tie-in of an increase in bilateral aid to the approval of the IMF program was made very clear 
by the aid community to the incoming government of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi. So much so that at 
the meeting between donors and government authorities held in Paris in June 1986 – a time when for all 
practical purposes the negotiations with the IMF had successfully ended --, the advanced countries 
promised funds for USD 3.7 billion, conditional on the IMF program staying on track and the reforms 
being implemented.  
In contrast with the previous 20 years, however, the new funding was not concentrated on large 
projects; instead, its goal was to allow the economy to get back on its feet, and reigniting growth. A 
substantial amount of aid was to have the form of “import support” and would finance the purchase of 







From today’s perspective it is easy to underestimate the magnitude of the task of reconstructing 
the country. The truth of the matter is that by 1986 the Tanzanian economy was completely destroyed and 
barely functioning. Markets had almost disappeared, barter had become generalized both in the 
countryside as well as in urban areas, and most people had given up hope. Just reestablishing a basic 
degree of confidence, and making markets function minimally was a monumental undertaking. As some 
authors have pointed out, it is possible to summarize the broad goal of the first round of reforms as an 
attempt at “getting prices right.”
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VII.1  The reforms: partial and incomplete 
A number of works have been written on the first phase of reforms, including (Utz, 2008), (Nord, 
et al., 2009), (Robinson, et al., 2011), (Mans, 1994), and (Mwase, et al., 2008). Many of these reforms 
were part of the IMF conditionality package and, as pointed out, their main goal was to “get prices right”.  
Initially, progress on most fronts was slow. Already in mid 1987, merely a year after the signing 
of the agreement with the IMF, the government was having difficulties meeting its fiscal targets, as 
domestic credit to marketing board and parastatals continued to grow at an unsustainable rate that greatly 
exceeded the programs targets. In addition, and in spite of the large initial devaluation, the currency 
continued to be overvalued. In mid 1987 the parallel market premium was still a very high 140%. 
From early on there were problems with both the speed and sequencing of reform (Mans, 1994). 
In particular, the open general license import program – which was geared at relieving the foreign 
exchange constraint -- got overwhelmed, and lacked a serious accounting system. Funds provided by 
donors were used very fast, and there was a clear perception that corruption and favoritism dominated 
their distribution. Marketing boards continued to channel the vast majority of exports in an inefficient 
way, and parastatal losses were not reduced sufficiently or fast enough.  Red tape and export licensing 
discouraged exports, especially for nontraditional products.  
In late 1988 the IMF was already signaling an increased level of impatience. Its Article IV 
Consultation report stated that in spite of very good weather, the supply response in the agricultural sector 
was hampered by serious transportation problems and “by the Government’s inability to implement its 
decision to reform the marketing system for foodstuff.”  The report also pointed out that the nation’s 
fiscal position had deteriorated due to “the slower-than-agreed pace of exchange rate devaluation and the 
deterioration in tax administration.”
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By early 1988 the authorities had abandoned the crawling peg regime, and allowed the real 
exchange rate to appreciate significantly. During the first 6 months of 1988 real appreciation amounted to 
14%, and by December 1988 the black market premium had climbed to 152%.   
In a 1990 report the IMF, once again, pointed out that the Tanzanian authorities “encountered 
serious difficulties in the implementation” of the program. Many of the problems had to do with 
continued inflationary pressures, a lack of reform in the centralized and government-run agricultural 
marketing scheme, and serious bottlenecks in the transportation system.  The IMF report pointed out that 
politics was at the center of the problem and that “the pace of implementation has been slow, reflecting in 
part the complexity in the decision making process in Tanzania.”
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In 1992, and after years of dragging their feet, the authorities introduced a major reform to the 
foreign exchange market. In April of that year the Foreign Exchange Act was passed and foreign 
exchange bureaus were allowed to operate. The purpose of this policy was to channel black and parallel 






volume of transactions was small, it increased steadily until in late 1993 it had become dominant. More 
important, the exchange rate was unified and the black market premium declined significantly, until by 
mid 1993 it had virtually disappeared (see Figure 3).   
Although this was an important measure, it was an isolated one that was not accompanied by 
productivity enhancing reforms, or by measures aimed at increasing efficiency, privatizing parastatals, or 
allowing the private sector to play a leading role in the economy. As the 1990s unfolded, the World Bank 
also became dissatisfied by the pace, sequencing and extent of reform. Although progress had been made 
in some areas – see (Edwards, 2012) for details --, there were still significant distortions, pervasive 
controls and mismanagement of the parastatal sector. In particular, the sole emphasis on stabilization and 
imports’ recovery was considered by the Bank staff to be insufficient.  
By 1993 a large number of parastatals continued to post very large losses. Banking reform was 
also insufficient, and the credit market continued to be controlled in a bureaucratic and arbitrary way.
 In 
1993 interest rates continued to be negative in real terms (-11%).
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Table 7 contains data on the most important indicators for the first phase of reforms. As may be 
seen, in terms of growth there is a marked difference between the early years (1986-1990), and the latter 
years (1991-1995). 1986 through 1990 were years of recovery, as production was able to resume and the 
most extreme economic bottlenecks were addressed. During that period GDP per capita grew, on average, 
at 2.2%. As it turned out, and as some donor agencies had feared, as the reforms stalled, economic growth 
began to falter. GDP per capita growth was negative in every year between 1991 and 1993: -0.3% in 
1991, -1.3% in 1992, and -4.1% in 1993. Table 7 also shows that inflation remained stubbornly high, and 
that the current account deficit didn’t budge. Also, and as may be seen from the Table, during the first 
years of the 1990s the investment to GDP ratio increased substantially: in 1992 it was 28.9% and in 1993 
it stood at 26.7%, up from 18.7% in 1985. The efficiency of investment, however, was very low. Indeed, 
according to Nord et al. (Nord, et al., 2009), during 1991-1995 total factor productivity growth was 
negative, on average: -2.0%.
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By 1993 many observers of the East African economic scene began to think that something had 
gone terribly wrong with the Tanzanian reforms.  
VII.2  The elite strikes back: Some political economy angles of the slow pace of reform  
The slow pace of progress in the reform front, and the precipitous fall in economic growth in the 
second half of the 1990s, was the result of a combination of factors, including the fact that anti-reformers 
were still entrenched in the government and had considerable power. Although Nyerere had stepped down 
from office in 1985, he was still chairman of the CCM, and, in that capacity, was extremely influential. 
He continued to criticize the IMF and to argue that efforts should be made to achieve self reliance and to 
move towards African Socialism. For him and his supporters giving in to the donors’ pressures in 1985-
1986 was equivalent to losing a battle; they had no intention of losing the war. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s it became increasingly clear that there was a wide cleavage 
between the IMF and World Bank and the (majority of the) authorities. While the former believed that 
Tanzania should largely abandon its socialist program, the latter were looking for something quite 
different: for them the goal was to maintain the overall direction of the Arusha Declaration, while 
correcting the excesses of the 1970s. In 1992 Kighoma Malima, who had fought so hard to keep the IMF 
out of Tanzania, was appointed Minister of Finance.  Although, by then Malima had tempered some of his 







Interestingly, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had, at least initially, a very limited effect on 
policy views in Tanzania. An important reason for this was that, as argued in the preceding sections of 
this paper, Nyerere had long advocated for an indigenous, non-Marxist, variant of socialism. Equally 
important, only a very small part of Tanzania’s aid budget came from the Warsaw Pact nations
103. 
Moreover, by the early 1990s the Nordic development agencies continued to be dominated by officials 
that had long supported the tenants of African Socialism.  
However, the Reagan and Thatcher administrations did have an important effect on aid policies 
by the U.S and the U.K. Both of these nations began to request, with a mounting sense of urgency, that 
the reforms were accelerated. But more important, at this time a new paradigm took over the World Bank. 
Increasingly and largely influenced by the East Asian successful experiences and by Latin America’s 
“lost decade,” the view at the Bank was that trade openness, market-orientation, and good governance 
were required conditions for economic development and growth. Bank economists and executives began 
to apply this new paradigm to African countries, and to turn their backs to Nyerere’s cult and Tanzaphilia.  
In early 1991, and with little fanfare, the CCM adopted the so called “Zanzibar Resolution” that 
eased the strict restrictions imposed on party leaders to own land and shares in private companies. In 
many ways this marked the “unofficial” abandonment of the Arusha Declaration and its goals. In spite of 
this, however, a number of conservative and highly nationalistic politicians – including Kighoma Malima 
-- continued to have significant influence and to resist what they considered to be the intrusive and 
extreme views of the donor community, and in particular of the IMF.      
 In October 1991 the Social Democrats were defeated in Sweden, and Prime Minister Ingvar 
Carlsson was replaced by Carl Bildt from the Moderate Party. During the next four years many of 
Sweden’s traditional welfare-state policies were altered, and the country’s foreign aid policy was 
thoroughly analyzed. Old African hands were shocked when the new government stated that from that 
point onwards one of the goals of its assistance program to the Third World was to help the recipient 
nation adopt a market economy system.
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In 1993 the Swedish government appointed a high level committee – the Secretariat for Analysis 
of Swedish Development Assistance – to analyze the results and effectiveness of their aid program to 
Tanzania. The report reached a number of conclusions, and made a series of suggestions, including that 
the recipient government had to contribute to the aid effort with counterpart funds. One of the report’s 
most important conclusions was: “Poor governance is obviously a severe problem in Tanzania today, and 
the poor quality of public administration must certainly have retarded economic growth.”
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By late 1993 it had become apparent that the Tanzanian reform process had stalled and that, in 
some areas it was even backtracking. As a result, the donor community -- including the Nordic donors -- 
became increasingly dissatisfied with their relationship with the government. From the donors' 
perspective there were three main problems: (1) there was corruption at every level (including, in 
particular, in the parastatals); (2) controls were being relaxed too slowly; and (3) the government was 
unable (or unwilling) to provide the local counterpart funds to help finance the import support programs. 
This latter problem stemmed from the authorities' unwillingness to reform the tax system, close tax 
loopholes, and raise taxes. Also, by 1993 most of the Nordic countries had finished evaluations on their 
aid programs. Most of these -- and in particular, the Swedish evaluation -- were critical of what had 







have the intentions to truly implement change, control the budget, or reduce inflation (which in 1993/94 
had reached 30% -- see Table 7 for details).
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VII.3 A turning point: The Helleiner Report 
In early 1994, and after a disappointing overall economic performance – including negative per 
capita growth and a rate of inflation that was approaching 30% --, there was a tense meeting between 
donors and the authorities, where accusations flew back and forth. As Helleiner (Helleiner, 2001 p. 1) has 
pointed out, the "somewhat prickly" personality of the minister of finance Kighoma Malima increased the 
degree of tension between the parties. Malima had blamed the aid community for the country’s problems; 
according to him the reduction of aid accounted for the poor growth performance, export growth 
disappointment, and inflationary pressures. Not surprisingly, the donors vigorously denied the accusation. 
For them the main problem was mismanagement pure and simple.  
Later that year, new data became available on the extent of tax evasion and the standoff between 
the two sides deepened. The Consultative Group meeting was cancelled, the IMF and World Bank put 
new programs on hold, and most bilateral donors suspended their non-project finance (Helleiner, 2001 p. 
4). The consequences of these measures had enormous significance: expected aid for 1995 declined from 
227,000 million Shillings to 151,000 million Shillings. From that point onwards bilateral aid continued to 
decline. For example, in 1995 bilateral net aid from Denmark was reduced to USD59.5 million, from 
USD94.8 million in 1992; bilateral aid from Finland was USD 9.4, down from USD34.9 in 1992; from 
Norway it was USD 54.4 million, while in 1993 it had been USD 82.1 million; and from Sweden aid was 
in 1995 USD 45.3 million, down from, 93.1 million in 1992. Even though Malima eventually resigned 
under pressure and a new minister was appointed, relations between donors and the government 
continued to be strained. 
In mid 1994 the Danish government suggested the creation of a commission that would mediate 
between the two parties. The commission was chaired by Professor Gerry Helleiner, who, as mentioned, 
had been a member of the Tanzania Advisory Group and had been the first director at the Economic 
Research Bureau at the University of Dar Es Salaam between 1966 and 1968. The other members were 
Professors Benno Ndulu and Nguyuru Lipumba from Tanzania, Professor Tony Killick from the U.K. and 
Professor Knud Erik Svendsen from Denmark.  The terms of reference for the commission were broad 
and flexible; its fundamental goal was to find ways to improve the relationship between donors and the 
authorities. This, in turn, was to assure a steady and (somewhat) predictable flow of aid, going forward. 
In an influential paper, Albert Hirschman (Hirschman, 1963) discussed the role of foreign 
advisors in stabilization programs in less developed countries. According to him, external advisors 
usually play the role of “umpires” that help local politicians select one out of many alternatives for action.  
He argues that this was the role played in the 1920s by the Kemmerer Mission that helped create many of 
Latin America’s Central Banks: “Kemmerer bills did not contain any substantial innovations with respect 
to the crucial topics…  The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the mission served principally as an 
umpire…”
107 Of course, Hirschman’s view is not restricted to the design of monetary policy. It equally 
applies to crises situations, including the design of stabilization plans or structural reform programs. 
Indeed, this is precisely his interpretation of the role played by a number of advisors in Latin America 









    In the “umpire” or “honest broker” model, foreign advisors don’t have superior knowledge or 
expertise; all they do is evaluate available information in a dispassionate way, and, after doing so, they 
indicate which course of action has the highest benefit-cost ratio. There is, of course, an alternative view: 
foreign advisors do have more knowledge – including on what has transpired in other countries that have 
faced similar situations -- and better information than domestic experts. Under this model the foreign 
advisor shares his knowledge with the country’s political leadership and decision makers, and by doing 
that he helps them move towards a converging position. According to this interpretation, by pointing out 
angles previously unseen by different domestic groups, the foreign advisor contributes to obtaining an 
earlier end to a “war of attrition.”  Players that would have refused to give up and change their position, 
decide, in light of this new information, to compromise earlier on.
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In both the “umpire” model and the “informed expert” model, the foreign advisor deals with 
groups of nationals that disagree on which course of action to take.
110 What makes the case of Tanzania 
quite unique is that the fundamental role played by foreign advisors – in this case the Helleiner 
Commission -- was not to mediate between different domestic groups, but between the government and 
external donors.
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The Helleiner Report, which was released in June 1995, recognized that the grievances of both 
the government and the donors were genuine; at the same time it asserted that these grievances could be 
addressed successfully. A serious problem was that the Tanzanian authorities felt that donors were 
excessively intrusive, and that they tried to impose on the government projects, programs and policies that 
the Tanzanians either didn’t understand or didn’t agree with. In the literature on foreign aid this problem 
has come to be known as the “ownership problem”: if aid recipients feel that they don’t “own” the 
policies and projects funded with the foreign assistance – that is, if they feel that they have no say in the 
design of the aid program –, there will be no enthusiasm during the implementation and follow-up 
periods. The Commission stated that “the ownership situation in Tanzania is at present unsatisfactory.” It 
also said that “ownership must mean that the final decisions rest with the recipient government.”
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At a practical level the Report made twenty one specific recommendations. The most important 
ones may be summarized as follows: 
 
  The government should prepare the first drafts of all important policy papers, including 
the Policy Framework Papers, Letters of Intent, and other joint documents with the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. (Recommendation 2). 
  Tanzania needs to improve greatly the capabilities of its public sector. This requires, at 
the general level, a deep civil service reform and at the specific level a strengthening of 
the capabilities of the Ministry of Finance. (Recommendations 3, 15 and 17). 
  Donors should be willing to withhold or delay aid until the local conditions are ready for 
the project to be “owned” by Tanzania. (Recommendation 5).  
  The incoming (Mkapa) government should formulate a “clear, practical medium- to 
long-term development strategy.”  In formulating this vision, local communities and the 
civil society should be consulted. (Recommendation 6). 
  Coordination: The government should avoid the duplication and proliferation of parallel 








duplication. There should be harmonization of projects and coordination across donors. 
(Recommendations 7, 8 and 9). 
  There is an urgent need to prioritize and coordinate assistance. This should be done by 
the government through the Rolling Plan and Forward Budget, as well as through 
extensive expenditure reviews. Donors should be consulted in defining priorities. Once 
these are defined, donors should adhere to them. (Recommendations 11 and 18).  
  The government needs to have information on the volume of funds – both donors’ and 
counterpart funds – committed to each project and program. This is fundamental for 
having an effective process of expenditures’ reviews. (Recommendation 10). 
  The calculation of “financing requirements” should be timely and accurate. This means 
that individual donor countries “should combine their assistance given in the form of 
new commitments and of debt relief.”  (Recommendation 13).  
  Social sector projects are more likely to succeed if civil society organizations participate 
in their design and implementation. For this to work out there should be clear lines of 
responsibility for the different government units, including local governments. 
(Recommendation 19). 
  Increased government credibility is of essence. In particular, corruption should be dealt 
with swiftly. (Recommendation 20). 
  Fiscal restraint and realism should be attained; budgetary control should be implemented. 
In particular, realistic budgets should be presented to parliament and to donors. Once 
these fiscal reforms are put in place, donors should resume suspended non-project 
support. (Recommendation 21). 
 
The new government of President Benjamin Mkapa made it clear, from the beginning, that 
restoring good relations with the aid community was one of its fundamental short term goals. In order to 
help achieve this fiscal objective, a cash management system for the public sector was instituted during 
the initial months of the new administration. As a result, the government could not spend beyond its 
revenues. This measure was important, as it showed donors that the new authorities were committed to 
changing the tone of the conversation and amending relations. 
 In mid 1996 –only a few months after the change of government -- there was a meeting between 
the new authorities and the Nordic donors to discuss the Helleiner Report. Both sides agreed with the 
Commission’s main conclusions and with its main recommendations.  Later that year the government 
signed a three year program under the IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).  
The new relationship between the donor community at large (including the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund) and the government was cemented in January 1997, when a workshop to 
discuss the way forward took place in Dar es Salaam. Discussions were intense, and were summarized in 
an extensive report authored by Professor Samuel M. Wangwe, titled “Development Cooperation Issues 
between Tanzania and its Aid Donors.”  In addition, the workshop produced 16 specific points for 
evaluating whether progress was being attained. Gerry Helleiner (Helleiner, 2001) has summarized the 
fundamental principles of this new agreement by two basic principles:  (1) “Tanzania takes the lead”; and 
(2) “Tanzania fully owns the development cooperation programs in terms of planning, design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation.”
113 Further progress was made in December 1997 when the 
Consultative Group met in Dar es Salaam instead of Paris.     
The Helleiner Report was followed-up by three evaluations written in 1997, 1999, and 2000 by 




“ownership” of the programs. The May 2000 report points out that, although significant progress had 
been made, there were still two main problematic areas. First, there were serious problems with “technical 
assistance.” Second, the main document defining how donors’ activities were to be inserted in the 
government’s strategy was considered to be extremely vague. 
There is no doubt that the Helleiner Report marked a turning point in the relationship between the 
government and the donor community. It was an effort ahead of its time that showed that dialogue, 
coordination, and prior planning helped increase the effectiveness of aid. It showed that “partnership” 
could be more that a buzzword, and that policies and programs were well received once there was 
(properly understood) “ownership.” With time, the principles of true “partnership” and “ownership” 
developed in the Helleiner Report have become the centerpiece of many donors’ relationship with poor 
countries in Africa and elsewhere. It is not an exaggeration to say that the highly consultative process 
currently used for writing the IMF’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the World Bank’s 
Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDFs) was influenced by the experience of Tanzania in the 
second half of the 1990s.   
 
VIII.-   The second round of reforms: 1996 to the present time 
In 1997 the government finalized a broad strategic document titled “Tanzania National 
Development Vision, 2025.” In its introduction the document states:
114 
 
“The three principal objectives of the Vision 2025… are: achieving quality and good life 
for all; good governance and the rule of law; and building a strong and resilient economy 
that can effectively withstand global competition…”  
 
An important feature of this document is that it explicitly criticized the policies of the Arusha 
Declaration: 
 
“[T]he strategy of the Arusha Declaration did not sufficiently address the complexity and 
dynamic character of policies and incentive structures which were necessary to 
effectively drive the development process.”  
 
The Vision did point out, however, that the policies pursued under Nyerere had resulted in the 
forging of a national identity and national unity, and had greatly reduced ethnic tensions. It said, 
“Tanzania today prides itself of and enjoys national unity, social cohesion, peace and stability largely as a 
result of the Declaration's core social values. These values have to be acknowledged and should form part 
of the underlying underpinnings of the Vision 2025.” 
As pointed out in Sections I and II of this paper, a number of authors have looked at the second 
wave of the Tanzanians reform. Those readers interested in details are referred to those works. In this 
(brief) section I provide a broad commentary on the modernization process. As noted by (Utz, 2008), 
(Mwase, et al., 2008), (Nord, et al., 2009), and (Robinson, et al., 2011), among others, the dominant areas 





regulatory framework consistent with a market-oriented economy, an improvement in the efficiency of 
monetary policy, banking reform, and the deepening of trade liberalization. Starting in the year 2000 
policy actions – including policies aimed at reducing policies -- have been organized around the National 
Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), or MKUKUTA. This is a comprehensive five 
year program that is put together after consulting with the donor community and, to some extent, with the 
civil society. The first MKUKUTA covered 2005 through 2010, and was organized around three major 
themes or “clusters”: (a) Growth and poverty reduction; (b) Improvement of quality of life and social 
well-being; and (c) Governance and accountability
115. MKUKUTA II was launched in mid 2010, and 
considered the same three clusters
116. From a growth perspective this strategy for 2010 through 2015 is 
very ambitious, and calls for an annual rate of growth of GDP between 8% and 10% on average for that 
period. 
After 1996, fiscal reform – including the creation of the Tanzania Revenue Authority, and the 
introduction of a value added tax in 1998 – was at the center of the modernization effort. By improving 
government finances several objectives were achieved: first, it became possible to plan ahead for the 
provision of the counterpart funds required by donors; second, inflationary pressures were contained (this 
was helped by the reform of the Bank of Tanzania operating procedures); third, by eliminating a number 
of loopholes the extent of corruption was put somewhat in check;
117 fourth, external crises (including 
currency crises) were avoided. Fiscal consolidation was aided by significant debt relief provided by 
donors.
118 An important consequence of fiscal reform is that the country was able to run a countercyclical 
fiscal policy in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008.
119  
As argued in the preceding Section, the first (and quite significant) steps towards trade openness 
and liberalization were taken during the first phase of reform. During the second phase further measures 
were put in place to reduce import tariff dispersion and increase competition. However, the most 
important development in the international trade front was the re-launching, in July of 2000, of the East 
African Community. The opening of the economy has been helped by a pragmatic exchange rate policy 
that has recognized the importance of a flexible approach, where the value of the currency is mostly 
(although not exclusively) allowed to reflect market forces. In particular, and in great contrast with the 
country’s history during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, since the early 2000s no effort has been 
made to avoid currency depreciation, or to defend a particular parity. Quite on the contrary, in the mid 
2000s the Bank of Tanzania intervened in the foreign exchange market in an effort to avoid the 
strengthening (in real terms) of the Shilling and, in that way, to maintain the degree of international 
competitiveness of exports. As a result of these intervention policies the Bank of Tanzania accumulated 
over USD 3 billion in net international reserves.  A number of studies suggested that in 2010 the real 
exchange rate was roughly in line with the equilibrium value justified by fundamentals. 
The most important differences, in terms of policies, between the two phases of reform have to do 
with parastatals. In the late 1980s, immediately after the first IMF Stand-by program, there were more 
than 450 parastatals that accounted for approximately 20% of GDP. Until the mid 1990s, and in spite of 
efforts made by the donor community, the parastal sector continued to incur in significant losses and was 
a source of the public sector deficit. Privatization took off after 1996, and by 2005 most manufacturing 










In the most recent World Bank’s Doing Business study, Tanzania is ranked in the 128
th position, 
out of 183 countries. On the positive side, the country’s is ranked higher than its GDP per capita would 
suggest. However, in the last few years Tanzania has slightly retrogressed in this ranking. Between 2010 
and 2011 the country has moved down in five categories – registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, and closing a business --, and has improved in only one of them, trading across 
borders. In three areas there has been no change. The lack of progress in improving the business 
environment has particularly affected investment in infrastructure. Investment in many areas continues to 
lag behind; transportation networks and ports are inefficient, reducing the degree of competitiveness of 
exports. Since 2005 investment in road has been less than one third of what was budgeted.    
For decades, one of the greatest burdens in Tanzania – and in most of Sub Saharan Africa, for that 
matter – was a highly inefficient (and, at some levels, corrupt) civil service. Indeed, the Helleiner Report, 
as well as individual donor evaluations, pointed to the bloated and inefficient civil service as one of the 
main roots of aid ineffectiveness. Public sector reform began in 1991 with the Civil Service Reform 
Program, aimed at reducing in the number of central government employees. However, during its initial 
years there were no changes in quality of services delivered, nor was there accountability for managers – 
See (Edwards, 2012) for details. In 2000 the first phase of the Public Sector Reform Program was 
launched in an effort to improve the skills of public sector employees. The second phase of the program 
was initiated in 2008 and its goal was to improve accountability.  At the same time legislation aimed at 
reducing corruption and enhancing transparency was approved – the National Anticorruption Strategy and 
Action Plan.  
One of the fundamental emphases of Tanzania’s social policies, clearly captured by the priorities 
set up in both MKUKUTA programs is education. In a number of ways these efforts have been highly 
successful. For example, between 2001 and 2008 enrollment in primary education increased from 59% to 
85%. This means that the number of 7 through 13 year olds going to school increased by almost 2.5 
million. More important, perhaps, most of the increase in enrollment has been in the rural areas (1.6 
million children). In addition, the enrollment rate for girls has increased significantly; it is presently 
slightly higher than for boys (0.86 versus 0.82). 
In terms of income levels, the expansion in primary education has especially benefited the second 
and third quintiles, which experienced increases in enrollment of 42% and 38% between 2001 and 2007; 
enrollment in the poorest quintile increased by a still very respectable 32% . On the other hand, the 
expansion of secondary education enrollment – which has gone from 7% in 2001 to 20% in 2008 – has 
mostly benefitted the poorest quintile: while in 2001 barely 2% of children in this group were enrolled in 
secondary education, in 2007 13% were enrolled.
120  
 
IX.-   Concluding remarks 
A few weeks ago (I write in early January 2012) Tanzania celebrated 50 years of independence. 
There is little doubt that the nation, its people and leadership have gone through a remarkable trip. In the 
short span of five decades they have gone through a veritable rollercoaster and have experienced a 
succession of situations that many nations have never faced, or have not faced during such a short period 
of time. The country has been through severe crises and miraculous recovery, broad nationalizations and 
socialist policies, and major market oriented reforms. At the same time as going through the experiences 
described above, during its life as an independent nation Tanzania has managed to avoid the scourge of 
tribalism and civil strife, and the horrors of coups and counter coups. This, indeed, sets the country apart 




analyzing in great detail. There are important lessons here for other poor countries – African and non 
African alike.    
  Is Tanzania a success story? And, can the aid agencies – both multilateral and bilateral – claim to 
have played a role in this success? As it is often the case in the real world, the answers to difficult 
questions are not straightforward.  
From a strict medium term perspective – and this is, indeed, the perspective taken by most of the 
aid organizations, including the IMF and the World Bank --, Tanzania looks, indeed, like a success story. 
Since 1995 – the year president Benjamin Mkapa took power – GDP per capita has increased by almost 
65% (which is significantly faster than the average for SSA), inflation has been kept in check, expenditure 
in social programs has increased markedly, macroeconomic stability has been preserved, the reforms have 
been furthered, and the relationship with the donor community has been constructive and cordial. It is 
indeed this picture what has prompted authors such as (Robinson, et al., 2011) to talk about success. 
Within this perspective, where the world (or, at least, Tanzania’s world) begins around 1995, the aid 
organizations can claim to have played a very constructive role in this story. 
  However, as one takes a long view, as I have done in this paper, and considers the fifty years 
since independence, a more nuanced picture emerges. Of course, the fact that the economy has done very 
well during the last 15 years (with the caveat of data quality) remains true. However, it is also true that the 
country collapsed completely in 1980-1985, and that it took many years (about a decade) for it to find its 
stride and begin to recover in earnest. In addition, and as the discussion in this paper clearly shows, the 
disintegration of the economy was the result of misguided policies and of a remarkable inability to change 
directions even in light of overwhelming evidence of failure. Also, the analysis in this paper shows that 
the international aid organizations and aid agencies in the advanced nations were accomplices in 
generating the collapse of the Tanzanian economy. 
  A simple way of illustrating this point is by performing very simple counterfactual exercises that 
compare the evolution of income per capita with alternative scenarios where the economy would have 
avoided the great crises of 1973-74, 1979, 1981-85 and 1991-1994, and instead would have grown at a 
steady and rather mediocre rate. Of course, in these non-crises counterfactual scenarios the boom of the 
last 15 years would not have taken place. I consider three such counterfactuals; all of them, of course, 
assume changes in policies that would have implied an early abandonment of the principles of the Arusha 
Declaration.  
  Counterfactual 1: Starting in 1970, that is three years after the Arusha Declaration, 
GDP per capita growth is 1.3% per year. This lukewarm rate continues until 2010.  
  Counterfactual 2: Starting in 1975 – that is after the 1973-1974 drought, and the clear 
signs that things were not going well, at all – growth becomes 1.3% per capita. 
Again, it assumes that after 1975 there are no crises or majors declines in GDP.  
  Counterfactual 3: This assumes that policy rectification takes place in 1980, at the 
time the IMF was thrown out of the country, and that from 1981 onward GDP per 
capita growth was 1.3% per year. Again, no crises after that point. 
 
In all three simulations the point of departure is 1965, two years prior to the Arusha Declaration. 
The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 5. As may be seen, the first two counterfactuals would 
have resulted in a higher income per capita in 2010 than what was actually observed. Counterfactual 3, on 
the other hand, results in a GDP per capita level in 2010 virtually identical to actual, observed GDP. 
  When one takes the longer view, as I argue one should, Tanzania doesn’t look quite like a 
successful story. It rather looks like a case of a remarkable recovery, but this is not the same as success. 44 
 
Indeed, if one takes the present value of the yearly income gap between any of the counterfactuals and the 
current situation, the values are enormous, indicating that the accumulated cost – in terms of losses of 
accumulate wealth and well being – of the experiment was enormous.  It is possible, of course, that 
Tanzania will continue to grow at a very fast rate – a rate similar to that of the last 15 years --, and that the 
“accumulated” present value of the GDP per capita gap will be, eventually, eliminated. However, until 
that happens it is difficult to label the experience a success; it may be a “success in the making” or a 
“promising” case of reform, but not a stellar success. 
     A comparative analysis on the pace of poverty reduction also suggests that it may be premature to 
refer to Tanzania as a clear-cut success. Comparative data indicate that, in spite of having posted fast 
(official) rates of growth, Tanzania has reduced poverty at a slower clip than Uganda and Ghana. The 
poverty headcount in Tanzania declined by 2.4 percentage points between 1991 and 2007. During 
approximately the same period poverty headcount fell 25 percentage points in Uganda, and 23 percentage 
points in Ghana. Moreover, while in 1991 both Uganda and Ghana had a higher poverty headline than 
Tanzania (55.7% and 51.7%, versus 38.6%), in 2007 they had a lower incidence of poverty than Tanzania 
(31% and 28.5%, versus 38.6%).
121 Other poor countries that have experienced similar growth as 
Tanzania, but have reduced the incidence of poverty much faster are India and Vietnam. These data 
suggest that, either the data on growth in Tanzania has been overestimated, or the development strategy 
followed in the last few years has not been as “pro-poor” as the government and the multilaterals (and, in 
particular, the World Bank) have argued, or both. Disentangling these effects is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but when taken in conjunction they suggest that both the data should be interpreted with care; 
further they suggest that the enthusiasm emerging from what in Section II I called the “official story” has 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Economic Indicators  Source  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Real GDP Growth (%)  (1)  4.5  3.5  3.7  4.8  4.9  6.0  7.2  6.9  7.8  7.4  6.7  7.1  7.4  6.0  7.0(*) 
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)  (2)  1.7  0.9  1.2  2.3  2.4  3.4  4.5  4.2  5.1  4.6  3.9  4.3  4.5  3.1  4.1(*) 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  (3)  16.5  14.7  19.6  17.1  16.4  17.0  18.7  20.0  21.2  22.5  23.8  25.0  26.3  29.3 




























(11)  38.7  44.8  46.1  45.0  46.9  56.6  56.0  62.2  56.5  45.3  52.5  72.9  54.9  69.7 
 
Inflation, Consumer Prices (annual %)  (12)  21.0  16.1  12.8  7.9  5.9  5.1  5.3  5.3  4.7  5.0  7.3  7.0  10.3  12.1  5.4 
Money and Quasi Money (M2) Growth (%)  (27)  8.4  12.9  10.8  18.6  14.8  34.2  25.6  18.0  13.5  34.8  21.5  20.5  19.8  17.7 
Official exchange rate (TSh/US$, period average)  (28)  580  612  664  744  800  876  966  1038  1089  1128  1251  1245  1196  1320  1409 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (CPI based, 
2005=100) 
(14)  122.2  136.0  144.0  139.8  141.1  143.4  133.3  113.1  102.7  100.0  93.9  93.3  97.5  99.4  90.6 
Exports (% of GDP)  (15)  19.9  16.2  12.4  12.5  13.4  17.0  17.6  18.6  19.7  20.8  22.6  24.3  22.6  23.2 
Imports (% of GDP)  (16)  31.9  25.7  25.0  22.9  20.1  21.3  19.8  22.8  26.1  29.7  35.7  37.1  39.1  35.2 
Volume indices of exports (2000=100)  (17)  117.1  75.7  72.2  75.8  100.0  125.9  139.0  154.7  166.7  174.9  166.7  173.1  205.9  182.9 
Volume indices of imports (2000=100)  (18)  86.0  57.7  76.3  93.7  100.0  116.2  111.3  131.6  152.9  161.1  193.5  220.6  249.2  256.3 
Terms of trade (merchandise, 2000=100)  (19)  95.3  98.7  98.4  99.1  100.0  95.2  98.3  101.7  103.0  98.0  109.0  110.0  107.9  121.1 
Social Indicators  Source  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Population (millions)  (21)  30.8  31.6  32.5  33.3  34.1  35.0  36.0  36.9  37.9  39.0  40.1  41.3  42.5  43.7 
Population Growth (%)  (22)  2.8  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.6  2.6  2.7  2.7  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.9  2.9  3.0 
Urban population (% of total)  (23)  20.9  21.2  21.6  21.9  22.3  22.7  23.1  23.4  23.8  24.2  24.6  25.1  25.5  26.0 
School enrollment, primary (% gross)  (24)  67.4  67.7  65.8  66.6  68.1  74.2  88.9  95.5  100.7  104.7  107.7  109.6  110.5  104.9 
School enrollment, Secondary (% gross)  (25)  5.2  5.6  6.1  6.3  6.8  7.4  7.6  9.3  11.0  13.6  20.0  25.2  27.4 











Proportion of Population Below Basic Needs Poverty Line  39.0  36.0  33.6  25.0  19.5  Unlikely to Achieve 
Under‐5 Underweight (%)  28.8  29.5  22.0  18.4  14.4  Unlikely to Achieve 
Under‐5 Stunted (%)  46.6  44.4  38.0  29.8  23.3  Unlikely to Achieve 
Primary School Net Enrollment Rate  54.2  58.7  97.2  87.2  100  Achievable 
Under‐5 Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)  191  153  112  99.6  64  Likely to Achieve 
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)  115  99  68  59.6  38  Likely to Achieve 
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live births)  529  ‐  578  244  133  Unlikely to Achieve 
Births Attended by Skilled Health Personnel (%)  43.9  35.8  63  77.1  90  Unlikely to Achieve 
HIV Prevalence, 15‐24 years (%)  6.0  ‐  2.5  <6  <6  Achievable 
Access to Potable Water (% of Rural Population)  51  42  57.1  67.6  74  Unlikely to Achieve 








1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
Australia     0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.8  2.3  0.8  1.6  2.8  2.2  5.6 
Austria  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.4  2.9 
Belgium  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  1.7  0.2  4.8  5.3  2.5 
Canada  0.1  0.2  0.6  0.9  1.4  2.5  2.8  1.9  2.7  5.1  6.1  11.1  31.6  32.0  20.3  9.7  29.0  28.6  19.4 
Switzerland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.7  2.0  3.1  14.0 
Germany  0.1  2.8  9.1  4.2  6.2  3.7  3.4  3.1  3.9  6.0  6.2  9.0  12.9  28.6  20.4  29.6  55.4  79.9  74.5 
Denmark  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.7  0.8  1.3  2.5  3.2  4.2  4.6  7.4  18.2  23.7  19.6  35.0  37.6  39.7  32.2 
Spain 
Finland  1.0  2.6  3.8  6.3  12.0  12.3  8.9  9.9  13.2  17.7 
France  7.0 
United Kingdom  9.8  33.7  37.7  23.2  24.7  17.8  11.8  2.8  3.7  1.6  3.0  3.9  2.8  2.1  2.0  7.2  6.6  10.4  18.6  45.1  73.2 
Greece    
Ireland  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.7  0.6 
Italy  9.0  6.2 ‐ 0.2  5.0  3.4 ‐ 1.1 ‐ 1.4 ‐ 1.5 ‐ 0.3  0.0 ‐ 0.4 ‐ 0.2 ‐ 0.4  0.5 
Japan  0.2  0.9  1.5  0.8  1.0  1.1  2.7  3.4  2.9  2.6  2.4  10.0  23.6  39.3 
Korea    
Luxembourg    
Netherlands  0.3  0.1  1.3  1.5  3.7  7.2  10.8  19.0  27.6  45.6  50.9  77.5  83.2 
Norway  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.8  1.4  2.9  3.5  6.9  10.8  17.2  14.5  25.7  30.7  35.1  44.2 
New Zealand             1.1  0.4  0.4  0.7  0.7  1.1 
Portugal    
Sweden  0.2  1.1  1.6  2.2  3.3  8.3  7.0  10.7  16.5  32.2  34.7  55.1  51.6  57.4  64.2  93.4  78.1 
United States  0.3  5.0  9.0  4.0  6.0  9.2  9.2  10.6  11.4  8.0  9.0  10.0  7.0  9.0  10.0  33.0  33.0  30.0  16.0  10.0  28.0 
European Union 
institutions                 
15.1  5.7  10.6  19.9  29.2  25.1 






1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991  1992  1993 1994 1995
Australia  7.3  9.6  10.5  7.0  4.1 3.0 2.0 3.0 4.2 8.0 1.7  2.3  1.7  2.0 1.2
Austria  4.0  2.3  1.2  1.2  0.4 0.7 2.7 1.8 1.0 3.1 6.3  3.8  11.0 6.4 8.5
Belgium  7.3  1.5  4.5  4.7  3.6 3.2 2.1 6.8 4.3 14.3 11.9  18.3  21.2 8.2 11.9
Canada  27.2  35.2  33.9  24.7  30.4 27.2 36.0 30.4 37.1 34.7 29.1  31.7  20.2 10.7 25.4
Switzerland  5.5  5.2  5.8  6.1  6.1 19.2 17.0 14.5 23.5 19.0 13.9  29.2  11.9 20.0 19.0
Germany  54.8  58.8  36.3  49.9  32.9 45.0 60.2 68.1 51.8 61.4 74.8  68.5  72.0 64.4 67.2
Denmark  32.8  39.8  40.4  31.6  37.0 54.9 49.2 77.8 78.7 78.6 89.1  94.8  80.9 76.6 59.6
Spain        0.5 4.6 6.6 1.8  1.6  0.4  0.4 1.3
Finland  16.0  14.8  18.8  21.1  16.6 28.9 34.2 67.2 55.4 51.0 40.6  34.9  15.7 22.5 9.4
France  9.2  6.2  5.0  5.6  1.5 2.0 5.2 2.6 18.3 4.5 11.1  28.7  20.4 10.0 20.2
United Kingdom  54.8  40.6  43.5  29.2  22.6 16.9 38.9 59.1 60.8 26.7 65.0  105.0  39.6 43.8 31.2
Greece          
Ireland  0.9  1.5  2.1  2.2  2.8 2.8 3.1 3.7 3.4 3.9 4.0  5.0  5.3  6.3 8.1
Italy  10.5  13.6  18.7  36.4  34.8 28.1 195.8 76.9 61.1 105.7 37.7  66.2  22.2 10.6 6.3
Japan  38.4  50.0  30.0  26.1  28.5 35.0 46.1 96.7 62.6 40.7 56.9  73.2  88.8 104.8 124.3
Korea        0.4  0.3  0.3 0.3
Luxembourg            0.2  0.0  0.0 0.1
Netherlands  69.7  56.3  34.5  40.6  36.9 60.7 74.1 78.9 71.4 94.5 56.4  50.5  55.1 57.8 77.4
Norway  40.1  51.9  54.9  46.4  45.4 71.8 75.2 79.1 57.5 102.9 85.6  82.1  68.6 50.3 52.2
New Zealand  0.7  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2 0.4
Portugal               
Sweden  76.5  73.8  69.3  55.1  49.0 106.4 76.5 103.6 90.4 149.6 143.0  93.1  91.0 51.3 45.3
United States  30.0  24.0  20.0  22.0  20.0 8.0 1.0 15.0 6.0 39.0 35.0  27.0  24.0 24.0 18.0
European Union 
institutions 
40.6  30.0  27.1  31.9  29.9 37.4 32.9 34.7 51.5 41.9 40.7  111.5  69.5 87.3 63.8




1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Australia  1.6  1.6  0.7  1.0  2.0  1.9  1.0  0.5  1.2  1.0  1.3  2.6  1.9  1.4 
Austria  8.8  5.6  8.7  6.0  5.7  4.8  30.3  1.7  3.2  2.4  1.7  1.5  1.7  13.0 
Belgium  10.2  7.3  61.0  18.7  7.4  16.1  70.6  8.8  17.6  6.3  14.7  13.8  18.5  21.2 
Canada  9.2  7.8  7.0  13.3  11.6  8.4  8.3  34.3  32.7  33.0  41.7  56.7  44.7  94.0 
Switzerland  15.6  24.3  14.0  21.4  12.7  17.0  19.3  25.6  26.0  23.6  26.4  24.0  27.7  27.0 
Germany  58.7  59.3  109.9  66.6  34.8  48.2  23.2  98.5  56.4  49.9  49.3  65.0  87.4  87.1 
Denmark  91.2  64.0  69.6  80.9  68.8  66.6  69.9  85.5  93.9  84.7  95.3  90.1  119.2  106.9 
Spain  3.9  5.1  2.9  1.4  0.3  1.9  0.3  2.5  5.8  4.1  3.9  8.0  3.4  25.1 
Finland  9.0  10.0  11.9  10.6  12.4  12.9  12.6  13.2  14.8  17.2  30.7  36.7  42.8  55.7 
France  3.5  79.6  7.5  4.9  15.8  13.1  16.0  1.6  120.0  2.5  2.0  3.0  4.8  7.9 
United Kingdom  67.3  67.6  158.6  88.6  152.7  285.4  109.3  285.5  215.6  220.4  218.9  230.7  254.2  216.7 
Greece  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.2  0.1 
Ireland  9.7  12.5  15.7  13.0  15.9  16.4  24.8  26.5  32.2  35.1  39.2  52.1  65.5  55.0 
Italy  3.2  3.9  3.4  33.9  0.7  1.5  132.3  1.3  5.1  4.7  2.2  4.3  6.0  6.7 
Japan  105.7  55.4  83.4  74.8  217.1  260.4  58.2  74.5  52.5  36.1  39.4  721.7  71.0  120.5 
Korea  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.6  0.8  1.2  2.4  3.8  9.4  7.2  9.2 
Luxembourg  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.7  0.5  0.6 
Netherlands  74.9  52.4  80.3  55.2  97.3  75.1  138.3  95.8  117.6  90.2  114.6  128.2  114.9  62.6 
Norway  54.4  50.9  44.6  49.7  35.2  34.9  46.7  67.4  59.6  60.3  75.4  114.3  127.7  116.4 
New Zealand  0.2  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.3  1.0  0.6  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.6  1.1  1.2  1.2 
Portugal 
Sweden  65.2  48.2  59.8  46.2  63.5  47.3  61.4  66.2  83.6  91.8  111.7  107.8  125.5  97.1 
United States  13.0  13.0  29.4  26.5  24.5  25.9  85.4  75.2  89.5  93.7  121.6  166.9  247.0  283.7 
European Union 
institutions 
44.3  63.9  43.2  71.0  32.4  96.7  70.2  185.1  161.9  155.8  188.8  187.1  184.8  138.4 





Economic Indicators  Source  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968 
Real GDP Growth (%)  (1)  4.2  7.1  4.1  6.5  2.7  12.8  4.8  5.1 
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)  (2)  1.3  4.1  1.1  3.5 ‐ 0.3  9.8  1.7  2.0 










               
‐3.9 
Total International Reserves (excluding gold, % of GDP)  (8)  6.7  6.5  7.7 
Net official development assistance received (% of GDP)  (10)  2.0  7.2  8.0  4.9  5.8  4.9  3.8  4.3  4.0 
Per Capita Net Official Development Assistance received 
(constant 2008 US$) 
(11)  11.2  38.3  41.8  27.2  36.8  27.2  22.4  24.8  23.5 
Inflation, Consumer Prices (annual %)  (12)  7.8  0.6  4.9  2.8  ‐2.4  9.8  12.2  15.6 
Money and Quasi Money (M2) Growth (%)  (27)  21.7  25.6  ‐15.2  31.8  476.7  13.7  17.3 
Official exchange rate (TSh/US$, period average)  (28)  7.14  7.14  7.14  7.14  7.14  7.14  7.14  7.14  7.14 
Exports (% of GDP)  (15)  32.1  27.5  27.0  30.0  27.8  26.1  28.6  26.5  24.2 
Imports (% of GDP)  (16)  29.8  29.8  27.3  26.6  23.2  25.1  27.0  26.2  26.7 
Terms of trade (1987=100)  (20)  130  124  137  142  137  137  126  126 
Social Indicators  Source  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968 
Population (millions)  (21)  10.1  10.4  10.7  11.0  11.3  11.7  12.0  12.4  12.8 
Population Growth (%)  (22)  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.1 
Urban population (% of total)  (23)  5.2  5.4  5.5  5.7  5.8  6.0  6.4  6.8  7.1 
Life Expectancy at Birth  (26)  43.6  43.9  44.1  44.4  44.7  45.0  45.3  45.6  45.9 












Economic Indicators  Source  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978 
Real GDP Growth (%)  (1)  2.3  6.0  3.8  5.3  3.5  2.5  5.9  5.4  0.4  1.2 
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)  (2) ‐ 0.8  2.8  0.6  2.0  0.2 ‐ 0.8  2.7  2.2 ‐ 2.8 ‐ 1.9 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  (3)  16.3  22.9  26.8  23.6  22.6  21.6  20.8  29.0  29.4  33.8 
External Debt (Total, long‐term, % of GDP)  (4)  16.4  93.8  93.4  96.7  87.5  83.3  80.7  83.2  79.6 
Revenue, Cash (Budgetary Central Govt., after 
grants) (% of GDP) 
(5)  15.3  17.5  17.3  16.9  19.7  21.2  22.7  18.6  19.1  24.3 
Expense, Cash (Budgetary Central Govt.)  
(% of GDP) 
(6)  20.3  21.5  24.3  21.9  22.4  26.6  32.5  25.9  22.1  30.3 
Cash surplus/deficit, Cash (Budgetary Cen. 
Govt.) (% of GDP) 
(7)  ‐5.0  ‐4.0  ‐7.0  ‐5.0  ‐2.7  ‐5.3  ‐9.8  ‐7.4  ‐3.0  ‐6.0 
Total International Reserves  
(excluding gold, % of GDP) 








(10)  3.7  4.4  5.0  4.4  6.1  8.3  12.7  10.1  10.7  10.9 
Per Capita Net Official Development Assistance 
received (constant 2008 US$) 
(11)  19.7  25.5  27.7  23.5  31.4  44.4  69.0  57.9  67.6  72.3 
Inflation, Consumer Prices (annual %)  (12)  16.4  3.5  4.8  7.6  10.4  19.6  26.1  6.9  11.6  6.6 
Money and Quasi Money (M2) Growth (%)  (27)  9.2  12.0  18.2  17.7  18.2  22.1  24.4  25.1  20.2  12.6 
Official exchange rate (TSh/US$, period 
average) 
(28)  7.14  7.14  7.14  7.14  7.02  7.13  7.37  8.38  8.29  7.71 





238.1  209.8  206.6  205.0  223.1  230.8  228.9  247.7  241.1 
Exports (% of GDP)  (15)  24.7  24.0  24.1  24.6  22.4  21.3  18.2  21.7  19.5  14.6 
Imports (% of GDP)  (16)  24.4  28.4  33.0  29.8  29.3  34.8  31.0  23.9  22.8  29.7 
Terms of trade (1987=100)  (20)  126  137  123  128  146  174  142  152  182  152 
Social Indicators  Source  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978 
Population (millions)  (21)  13.2  13.6  14.0  14.5  15.0  15.5  16.0  16.5  17.0  17.5 
Population Growth (%)  (22)  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.2  3.2  3.2  3.1 
Urban Population (% of total)  (23)  7.5  7.9  8.5  9.2  9.8  10.5  11.1  11.8  12.5  13.2 
School Enrollment, Primary (% gross)  (24)  33.8  35.2  37.5  40.2  43.5  53.1  63.1  71.1  90.7 
School Enrollment, Secondary (% gross)  (25)  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.8  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.3 
Life Expectancy at Birth  (26)  46.3  46.7  47.0  47.4  47.9  48.3  48.7  49.0  49.4  49.7 














Economic Indicators  Source  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Real GDP Growth (%)  (1)  3.4  3.0  0.5  0.6  2.4  3.4  4.6 
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)  (2)  0.2 ‐ 0.2 ‐ 2.7 ‐ 2.6 ‐ 0.8  0.2  1.4 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  (3)  33.6  33.1  28.6  26.0  19.3  20.2  11.3 
External Debt (Total, long‐term, % of GDP)  (4)  66.9  73.8  66.2  62.5  72.9  83.1  48.4 
Revenue, Cash (Budgetary Central Govt., after grants) 
(% of GDP) 
(5)  21.9  23.7  19.8  16.7  19.9  17.3  17.9 
Expense, Cash (Budgetary Central Govt.) (% of GDP)  (6)  33.3  33.3  30.1  28.1  27.7  23.9  25.4 
Cash surplus/deficit, Cash (Budgetary Cen. Govt.) 
(% of GDP) 
(7)  ‐11.4  ‐9.6  ‐10.2  ‐11.3  ‐7.9  ‐6.6  ‐7.5 
Total International Reserves (excluding gold, % of GDP)  (8)  1.6  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.6  0.2 
Current Account Balance (excluding exceptional 
financing, % of GDP) 
(9)  ‐8.1  ‐11.4  ‐7.2  ‐8.6  ‐5.5  ‐7.4  ‐3.9 
Net official development assistance received (% of GDP)  (10)  13.7  14.7  12.4  11.2  10.6  11.2  5.0 
Per Capita Net Official Development Assistance received 
(constant 2008 US$) 
(11)  86.3  87.7  94.8  92.8  80.9  77.3  65.4 
Inflation, Consumer Prices (annual %)  (12)  12.9  30.2  25.7  28.9  27.1  36.1  33.3 
Money and Quasi Money (M2) Growth (%)  (27)  46.9  26.9  18.1  19.5  17.8  3.7  30.4 
Official exchange rate (TSh/US$, period average)  (28)  8.22  8.20  8.28  9.28  11.1  15.3  17.5 
Black Market Premium (end of the period, %)  (13)  64.2  223.9  192.6  204.7  301.4  286.6  259.4 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (CPI based, 2005=100)  (14)  220.0  266.1  342.7  416.5  462.0  465.7  533.5 
Exports (% of GDP)  (15)  14.1  13.2  12.2  8.5  8.0  9.0  6.8 
Imports (% of GDP)  (16)  26.9  26.3  20.7  17.7  14.1  16.7  16.8 
Terms of trade (1987=100)  (20)  139  142  129  127  128  131  126 
Social Indicators  Source  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Population (millions)  (21)  18.1  18.7  19.3  19.9  20.5  21.1  21.8 
Population Growth (%)  (22)  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.2  3.2  3.2  3.1 
Urban Population (% of total)  (23)  13.9  14.6  15.0  15.5  15.9  16.4  16.8 
School Enrollment, Primary (% gross)  (24)  94.2  95.6  97.2  93.3  91.5  86.9  76.4 
School Enrollment, Secondary (% gross)  (25)  3.4  3.3  3.1  3.0  3.1  3.1  3.3 
Life Expectancy at Birth  (26)  49.9  50.2  50.4  50.6  50.8  50.9  51.1 













Economic Indicators  Source  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Real GDP Growth (%)  (1)  6.6  5.9  4.4  3.8  7.0  2.1  0.6  1.2  1.6  3.6 
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)  (2)  3.5  2.8  1.3  0.6  3.8 ‐ 1.3 ‐ 2.9 ‐ 2.2 ‐ 1.7  0.5 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  (3)  15.5  23.5  16.1  17.7  25.8  26.0  27.0  24.9  24.4  19.6 
External Debt (Total, long‐term, % of GDP)  (4)  63.7  103.0  103.0  119.5  135.6  117.1  127.4  136.8  136.3  119.1 
Revenue, Cash (Budgetary Central Govt., after 
grants)(% of GDP)  (5)  15.5  9.9  12.5  14.4  15.1  14.7  15.1  12.9  15.2  12.9 
Expense, Cash (Budgetary Central Govt.) (% of 
GDP)  (6)  21.4  14.5  14.9  16.7  17.0  19.1  11.8  15.3  16.3  13.2 
Cash surplus/deficit, Cash (Budgetary Cen. 
Govt.) (% of GDP)  (7)  ‐5.8  ‐4.7  ‐2.4  ‐2.3  ‐1.8  ‐4.4  3.3  ‐2.4  ‐1.1  ‐0.3 
Total International Reserves  
(excluding gold, % of GDP)  (8)  0.9  0.7  1.5  1.2  4.5  4.1  7.1  4.8  7.4  5.1 
Current Account Balance  
(excluding exceptional financing, % of GDP)  (9)  ‐4.6  ‐8.7  ‐7.0  ‐7.6  ‐13.1  ‐14.9  ‐15.5  ‐21.0  ‐14.1  ‐11.2 
Net official development assistance received  
(% of GDP)  (10)  9.5  19.0  19.8  20.5  27.3  21.6  29.0  22.2  21.3  16.5 
Per Capita Net Official Development Assistance 
received (constant 2008 US$)  (11)  69.4  77.9  76.2  68.2  73.4  63.4  72.8  52.8  48.8  38.2 
Inflation, Consumer Prices (annual %)  (12)  32.4  29.9  31.2  25.8  35.8  28.7  21.8  25.3  34.1  27.4 
Money and Quasi Money (M2) Growth (%)  (27)  27.7  32.1  32.8  32.1  41.9  30.1  40.6  39.2  35.3  33.0 
Official exchange rate (TSh/US$, period 
average)  (28)  32.7  64.3  99.3  143.4  195.1  219.2  297.7  405.3  509.6  574.8 
Black Market Premium (end of the period, %)  (13)  248.0  138.9  100.0  44.0  78.0  71.0  19.4  1.7   
Real Effective Exchange Rate (CPI based, 
2005=100)  (14)  310.6  174.9  140.1  121.1  105.9  118.7  100.9  96.4  96.8  100.0 
Exports (% of GDP)  (15)  9.6  9.0  9.6  11.3  12.6  10.3  12.4  18.0  20.6  24.1 
Imports (% of GDP)  (16)  25.0  26.3  27.9  32.9  37.5  33.6  39.4  47.7  43.6  41.5 
Volume indices of exports (merchandise, 
2000=100)  (17)  51.3  45.1  50.9  49.4  48.2  64.1  67.2  71.2  106.0 
Volume indices of imports (merchandise, 
2000=100)  (18)  115.0  75.0  72.2  95.2  105.7  99.1  97.3  96.8  111.0 
Terms of trade (merchandise, 2000=100)  (19)  160.4  127.8  120.0  107.4  111.5  98.0  100.0  107.8  98.0 
Social Indicators  Source  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Population (millions)  (21)  22.5  23.2  23.9  24.7  25.5  26.3  27.2  28.2  29.1  30.0 
Population Growth (%)  (22)  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.5  3.4  3.3  3.1 
Urban Population (% of total)  (23)  17.2  17.6  18.1  18.5  18.9  19.2  19.5  19.9  20.2  20.5 
School Enrollment, Primary (% gross)  (24)  73.7  71.5  69.5  69.4  69.7  70.1  69.6  69.8  68.7  68.2 
School Enrollment, Secondary (% gross)  (25)  3.5  3.9  4.3  4.6  5.0  5.3  5.3  5.3  5.3  5.4 
Life Expectancy at Birth  (26)  51.2  51.2  51.1  51.0  50.8  50.6  50.4  50.2  50.0  49.9 
Physicians (per 1,000,000 people)  (29)  38.8      41.9  41.0 
Sources:  
(1), (2), (3), (10): WDI and Bigsten & Danielson (2001) 
(4) UNCTADstat, Bigsten & Danielson (2001), WDI 
(5), (6), (7): IFS 
(8), (9): IFS, WDI, Bigsten & Danielson (2001) 
(11), (12), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), (29): WDI 
(13), (14): Author’s calculations based on World Currency Yearbook and IFS; UNCTADstat and WDI 
(15), (16): IFS and WDI 
(17), (18), (19): UNCTADstat  